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Abstract
The cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia provide two opportunities for the community of nations to reconcile the rights of Serbia and Georgia with the rights of the peoples within their
borders. Instead of doing so, other countries used these cases for ideological and political posturing and continued to do so as of the end of 2008. This Note will review Kosovo and South Ossetia
and attempt to take the politics out of an inherently political decision-whether or not to recognize
them as independent states. Part I of this Note will review how the United Nations has approached
the issues of autonomy, borders, secession, and minorities. It will also provide background on
the doctrines of self-determination and the rights of states. Part II will set out the facts-as they
are generally accepted-of Kosovo and South Ossetia and consider the differing opinions regarding independence of the two areas. Part III will review those opinions in light of the goals and
doctrines of the United Nations and how it has approached these issues in the past. The Note concludes that recognition of independence of the states should be driven by legal arguments rather
than political or social alliances and that the goals of the United Nations are best served by being
steadfast in promoting multi-ethnicity within political entities; Kosovo and South Ossetia should
be recognized as autonomous regions within Serbia and Georgia, respectively. The Note also concludes that domestic as well as international legal structures must be in place to make autonomy
workable.

NOTE
THE DISTINCT CASES OF KOSOVO AND SOUTH
OSSETIA: DECIDING THE QUESTION OF
INDEPENDENCE ON THE MERITS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ronald Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
It is doubtful that all Georgians would say, "we are all
Georgians."' Within the former Soviet nation of Georgia there
are several other, non-Georgian ethnic groups, including the
Ossetians and Russians of South Ossetia. 2 Similarly, Kosovar
Albanians may object to being identified as "Serbian," whether
that term is used to describe an ethnicity or a state's citizen.3 As
countries such as France and the Netherlands struggle to
assimilate new ethnic groups into their societies and within their
* J.D., 2009, Fordham University School of Law; M.B.A., 2006, Fordham Graduate
School of Business Administration; B.A., 1976, University of Denver. I would like to
thank Professor Joseph Sweeney for his insightful direction on this project and Annie
Chen for her thoughtful editing. I am also grateful to my colleagues at Time Inc. and
William Stubing for their steadfast support, flexibility and encouragement.
1. See Posting of Robert Barnes to The Trail, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
the-trail/ (Aug. 12, 2008, 14:24 EST) (reporting on the comment made by SenatorJohn
McCain, speaking to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili).
2. See
Georgia, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html
(Sept. 29, 2009)
(listing Azeris,
Armenians, and Russians as the three major ethnic groups behind Georgians);
Memorandum from Comm. for Human Rights & Ethnic Minorities of the Parliament of
Georgia to Giorgi Topouria (Dec. 3, 1996), available at http://www.sakartvelo.com/
Files/Conflicts/minorities.html (identifying other groups as Armenians, Azerians,
Russians, Ossetians, Abkhazians, Greeks,Jews, and Kurds).
3. See, e.g., Serbs, Ethnic Albanians Discuss Kosovo, CHINADAILY, Oct. 10, 2003,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-10/15/content_272122.htm
(characterizing the meeting sponsored by the United Nations ("UN") in which Serb and
Kosovar Albanian leaders "clashed" and refused to shake hands); see also Albanians Flee
Serbia for Kosovo, BBC NEWS, Aug. 2, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
410402.stm (reporting on the effective partitioning of Mitrovica, Kosovo, between Serbs
and Albanians).
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borders, 4 ethnic groups in former Soviet-bloc nations are
struggling to avoid assimilation into countries whose borders
5
were defined during the Cold War or earlier.
At the end of the Second World War, nations united "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.... "6 It may
seem that defining political borders based on the geographic
location of ethnic groups is the easiest path toward saving
However,
succeeding generations from constant fighting.
defining those borders is no easy task, and as Kosovo and South
Ossetia have shown, attempting to do so through unilateral
declarations of independence is no savior from the scourge of
Indeed, when "independence" means freedom from
war.
working with others of different ethnic backgrounds, the very
concept of independence undermines the intent of the United
Nations to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small.... "' Conflict
must be managed not only between people and between states,
but between people and states. 8 The people-state conflict arises
when the right of nations to maintain their recognized borders

Jumana Farouky, The Many Faces of Europe, TIME, Feb. 15, 2007, available
4. See, e.g.,
(describing
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1590190,00.html
the increasing Muslim population in Europe); see also James Taranto, Our Culture is
Better: The Weekend Review with Geert Wilders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29-30, 2008, at All
(profiling the Dutch politician Geert Wilders and his views on Islamic culture as it fits
within the Netherlands and Europe, distinguishing Islam and the Muslim people).
5. South Ossetia, part of the Georgian province of Shida Karti, or Tskhinvali, was
incorporated into Georgia with its current borders following the Bolshevik occupation
South Ossetia, BBC NEWS,
of the
1920s.
See Regions and Territories:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/countryprofiles/3797729.stm (last visited July 14,
2009) [hereinafter South Ossetia]; see also Rafael Behr, Fear of Russian "Protection"Spreads
to Ukraine and the Baltic, OBSERVER (London), Aug. 17, 2008, at 28, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/17/georgia.russial (noting that over 17%
of Ukrainian citizens are ethnic Russians and reporting that Russia agitates on behalf of
the ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia, many of whom were denied citizenship in
those countries).
6. U.N. Charter pmbl.
7. id.
8. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signatureDec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
Article 2, para. 3(a), for example, admonishes a state to remedy infringements upon a
person's rights and freedoms, even if the infringement was committed by an agent of
the state, acting in an official capacity. Id. art. 2, para. 3(a).

1992 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1990
clashes-or is believed to clash-with the right of citizens within
those borders to exercise self-determination. 9
The cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia provide two
opportunities for the community of nations to reconcile the
rights of Serbia and Georgia with the rights of the peoples within
their borders. Instead of doing so, other countries used these
cases for ideological and political posturing and continued to do
so as of the end of 2008. This Note will review Kosovo and South
Ossetia and attempt to take the politics out of an inherently
political decision-whether or not to recognize them as
independent states. Part I of this Note will review how the
United Nations has approached the issues of autonomy, borders,
secession, and minorities. It will also provide background on the
doctrines of self-determination and the rights of states. Part II
will set out the facts-as they are generally accepted-of Kosovo
and South Ossetia and consider the differing opinions regarding
independence of the two areas.
Part III will review those
opinions in light of the goals and doctrines of the United Nations
and how it has approached these issues in the past. The Note
concludes that recognition of independence of the states should
be driven by legal arguments rather than political or social
alliances and that the goals of the United Nations are best served
by being steadfast in promoting multi-ethnicity within political
entities; Kosovo and South Ossetia should be recognized as
autonomous regions within Serbia and Georgia, respectively.
The Note also concludes that domestic as well as international
legal structures must be in place to make autonomy workable.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AN EXERCISE INAPPLYING THE
SOLID PRINCIPLES OF AMBIGUOUS DECLARATIONS TO
AMBIGUOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
A.
1.

The U.N. Mission

Self-Determination vs. Territorial Integrity

The United Nations ("U.N.") Charter gives little clue as to
how the founding international community intended to deal with
situations such as Kosovo and South Ossetia. While the Charter
9. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
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refers to "equal rights and self-determination of peoples," 0 and
the "territorial integrity" of states," these principles do not
provide guidance for resolving a situation in which a population
seeks self-determination in a way that threatens the territorial
integrity of a state. Resolutions from both the Security Council
and the General Assembly augment the Charter and more
directly address, without resolving, the tension between the rights
of states and the rights of peoples within those states.1 2 Less
ambiguous is the overarching goal of the United Nations,
expressed in article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter: "to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace . ..,I With that overarching
goal in mind, this Part reviews some of the relevant resolutions of
the U.N. bodies. In addition, it reviews the history that led to the
establishment of the United Nations.
This history is an
important key to understanding why and how the United Nations
intends to avoid "breaches of the peace," particularly as they
relate to the tension between self-determination and territorial
integrity in Kosovo and South Ossetia.
".

2.

Resolutions on Self-Determination; Resolve on Secession

The concept of independence in the Charter focuses on the
independence of former colonies or territories. 14 The United
10. Id. (declaring that one of the purposes of the organization is to develop
relations among states based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination).
11. Id. at art. 2, para. 4 (mandating that member states refrain from actions that
threaten the territorial integrity of other states).
12. See, e.g.,
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123-24 U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter "1970 Declaration"] (stating that states should
actively promote, either singly or jointly, equal rights and self-determination and
declaring that the establishment of independent states (from colonialism) is one
method of promoting those goals); S.C. Res. 1462, 2,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1462 (Jan. 30,
2003) (reaffirming "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized
borders, and the necessity to define the status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia in
strict accordance with these principles").
13. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
14. See id. arts. 73-91; see also JOHN A. PERKINS, THE PRUDENT PEACE 80 (1981)
(noting that attention has focused on decolonization and that "[e]ven the 1970
Declaration does little to spell out how the principle of self-determination is to be
implemented in noncolonial situations.").
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Nations does not, as a rule, condone redrawing borders for
disputes arising from ethnic differences 15 and has resisted
"external self-determination "-i.e., secession-leaning instead
toward "internal self-determination" while maintaining the
"territorial integrity" of existing states. 16 Nonetheless, the
17
organization has not ruled out secession in colonial contexts.

15. See U Thant, 7 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 36 (1970) (declaring that the U.N.
attitude against secession is unequivocal). Individual nations have likewise been hesitant
to recognize unilateral declarations of independence. See, e.g., Johanna McGeary,
Freedom Fightersfrom Kosovo to Kurdistan, Rebels Vie for Independence: Here are the Reasons
Some Succeed-and Some Don't, TIME, Mar. 8, 1999, at 42 (registering no surprise that the
1999 peace conference in Rambouillet, France, produced only modest returns). Rather
than addressing the issue of Kosovo's independence,
"The beauty of the interim accord is that no one has to give up their dreams,"
explains U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill. "We've created this gray thing that
one side will call an elephant and the other will call a mouse." Trouble is,
some members of the Albanian delegation saw through that and demanded a
written guarantee of eventual independence. No way, said NATO. "Sure, they
can ask for it," Hill adds, "but getting it is another matter. Today, the
international community does not support the idea of an independent Kosovo.
It's not a right they have."
Id.
16. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (mandating that member states refrain from
actions that threaten the territorial integrity of other states); see also 1970 Declaration,
supra note 12, Annex (declaring that the resolution is not to be construed to encourage
the dismemberment of a state, with the caveat that the state must act "in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination"). The Soviet Union's peace
proposals expanded the meaning of "self-determination" to endorse the right to
secession. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, THOMAS M. FRANCK & DAVID M. MALONE, LAW AND

PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 409 (2008); see also jure Vidmar, Montenegro'sPath to
Independence: A Study of Self-Determination, Statehood and Recognition, 3 HANSE L. REV. 73,
75 (noting that Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov-Lenin invoked self-determination, based on
socialist political philosophy and "wedded the right of self-determination to the right to
secession").
This long-standing wedding of self-determination and secession
notwithstanding, Russia has vigorously fought against Chechnya's independence, an
attitude supported by the international community's cool response to Chechnya's bid
for autonomy. See CHESTERMAN, supra, at 442. The United Nations has condemned
Russia's use of excessive force in Chechnya while also choosing to deny Chechnya's
claims for independence. See id. at 443 (citing Russia: UN Human Rights Chief Senses
"Climate of Fear" In
Chechnya,
RADIO
FREE
EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY,
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066139.html (last visitedJuly 17, 2009)).
17. See, e.g., Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-First
Session, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 25, U.N. Doc. A/34/10 (1979), reprinted in
[1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 25, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.I(Part 2),
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_
1979_v2_p2_e.pdf (recognizing that there may be cases "following a referendum on selfdetermination" that part of a state may detach itself from a larger state). The situation
discussed in this document refers to part of a state annexing itself to another existing
state, however, rather than becoming an independent state. It also does not discuss the
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Such is the case with regards to self-determination, as in
Resolution 1514 (XV), which recognizes the desire of a people to
secede from an "alien" government.1 8
Resolution 2625,
"Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" ("1970
Declaration"), speaks with authority on the conduct of nations,
proscribing
external
interference
and
balancing
selfdetermination and territorial integrity. 19 Resolution 47/135,
"Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities" ("Declaration on
Minorities"), presupposes that there will be minorities within
states and that those minorities may be subject to oppressive rule
by the majority. It mandates that states shall not only protect, but
promote the ethnic identity of the minorities within their
borders.2 0 At the same time, the declaration states that it shall
not be construed as working against the sovereignty and
21
territorial integrity of the state in which the minorities reside.
These resolutions, as a body of work, accept the possibility of

nature of the referendum, i.e., whether the referendum must be held state-wide or in
only the territory that is seceding. See id.
18. See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV),
1, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (declaring that "[t]he subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the
promotion of world peace and co-operation" and that "[a]ll armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the
integrity of their national territory shall be respected").
19. See 1970 Declaration, supra note 12, at 123-24. John A. Perkins gives four
sources for the 1970 Declaration's authority: 1) the principles of the resolution are
either explicitly or implicitly contained in the U.N. Charter; 2) the resolution went
through a process that created consensus among the states; 3) the resolution explicitly
states (in section 3) that it embodies the principles of the U.N. Charter, which are the
principles of international law; and 4) the resolution incorporates paragraphs from
some prior resolutions, sometimes with modifications, thus leading to the conclusion
that the paragraphs in the Declaration have gone through a rigorous review process as
law. PERKINS, supra note 14, at 66-67.
20. See G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 1,
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Feb. 3, 1993)
("States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage
conditions for the promotion of that identity.").
21. See id. art. 8,
4 ("Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as
permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.").
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secession, but do not define the circumstances that would justify
secession, particularly in non-colonial contexts. They stress
territorial integrity of states and also declare states' duties toward
the minorities within their borders.
Between the founding of the United Nations and the
breakup of the Soviet Union, new states were established
primarily through the result of decolonization, with a few
2
exceptions, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Singapore. 2
Pakistan, created forty-five years before the Declaration on
Minorities, is an example of a nation created out of concern for a
minority population, in this case a minority of Muslims in a
country with a Hindu majority.2 3
If Britain hoped that
independence for the Muslim people of India would help fulfill
the mission of the United Nations and make future generations
safe from the scourge of war, it would be disappointed; tensions
continue, but rather than being an internal issue of minority
rights, they are now an international issue concerning two
nuclear-power states. 24 Pakistan could therefore be viewed as
evidence that supports the United Nations' reluctance to create a
new country based on a minority population.
The United Nations' hesitancy to accept secession as a
solution to internal tensions25 predates Pakistan, however, and
22. See Tenth Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other Than Treaties, at
232-35, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/313 (1978) (documenting briefly the circumstances leading
to the independence of the states, but focusing on the apportionment of property).
23. See generally CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2010:
PAKISTAN,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
pk.html#Intro (last visited July 14, 2009) (providing an overview of the creation of
Pakistan and the conflict between India and Pakistan); see also Girilal Jain, India, Pakistan
and Kashmir, in INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEHRU YEARS 42, 48-49 (B.R. Nanda ed.,
1976) (questioning the role of the British government in the demand for partition of
India and Pakistan; suggesting that the Muslim elites "defined the community's identity
in religious and not in territorial terms" because "it offered them solace in the period of
their political and economic decline;" and noting that after partition "over one-third of
the Muslims were bound to be left in India").
24. See B.R. NANDA, INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEHRU YEARS 1, 8 (1976); see also
Zahid Hassain, PakistaniFiringExposes Rift Over Mumbai Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009,
at A5 (characterizing the effect on bombings in Mumbai as escalating tensions between
the two rival nuclear powers); Anthony Spaeth, Looking Down the Barrel, TIME, Jan. 14,
2002,
at
28,
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,190848,00.html (reporting that both countries were ready to go to war in 2002
after thirty years of an easing of tensions).
25. See Thant, supra note 15 (observing that "the United Nations has never
accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of
secession of a part of its Member State.").
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may be a legacy of the League of Nations. The League's
Commission of Rapporteurs stated its philosophy when it
rejected the Aaland Islands' petition to break from Finland and
realign themselves with Sweden: Conceding to the desires of
26
minorities, the Commission declared, was a threat to stability.
Michael Bothe, Professor of Public Law at Johann Wolfgang
Goethe Universitdt, Frankfurt, and Dr. Thilo Marauhn, Professor
of International Law at Justus Liebig UniversitAt, Giel3en, offer
this explanation for caution regarding secession: "If each ethnic
conflict became an issue about the right to external selfdetermination, this might enhance the divisive character of these
conflicts and, eventually, international law might contribute to
the deepening of the ditches between parts of the populations
27
who would then live better together rather than separately."
Another negative outcome was suggested by Irakli Alasania,
Georgia's Ambassador to the United Nations, who warned at a
press briefing after the hostilities in South Ossetia, "If [violent
actions for independence] are now accepted by the international
community, it will mean that foreign sponsored groups around
the world can use violence and ethnic cleansing to achieve their
ends and be rewarded with independence."' 28 If true, this would
26. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations
Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 304 (1994) (quoting the Commission's belief that secession
by minorities or other factions within states would promote instability, even when the
majority of the people in the area in question would vote to realign itself). The
Commission did allow for the exceptional case when the state from which a minority is
looking to secede is either unable or unwilling to provide necessary freedoms to the
minority. SeeJohn Dugard & David Raid, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 94, 107 (Marcelo G. Kohen
ed., 2006) (quoting the Commission of Rapporteursin the Aaland Island Dispute, League of
Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106 (1921)). For an indication of how the Aaland Islands have
fared despite the Commission's refusal to recognize the realignment, see Fredrik Dahl,
Finland'sAaland Islands May Stay Outside the EU, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1994 (describing
the Aaland Island's political and economic autonomy within Finland, with some
exceptions, such as taxation); John Pomfret, Plan Offers Self-Rule for Croatia Serbs: Idea
Floated to End Stalemate in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1994, at A38 (reporting that a
peace plan for Croatia "borrowed liberally from other autonomy deals in Europe, such
as one for ethnic Swedes inhabiting the Aaland Islands").
27. Michael Bothe & Thilo Marauhn, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor:
Concept, Legality and Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration, in
KOSOvo AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT 217, 239
(Christian Tomuschat ed., 2001).
28. H.E. Irakli Alasania, Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United
Nations,
Statement
at
Press
Briefing
(Aug.
26,
2008),
available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EDIS-7HWLAD?OpenDocument.
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run counter to the United Nations' respect for law and order,
and its overarching goal of establishing and maintaining peace
would be defeated. The United Nations' hesitancy to accept
secession, then, may be well-founded.

3.

The League of Nations and Structures Begun at the End of
World War I

a. Redrawing Borders and Recognizing States Through Caprice
or Principle
Along with a reluctance to accept secession, the United
Nations inherited from its post-World War I legacy state borders
that were drawn "without benefit of an integrating intelligence at
the top or of the broader perspective that the presence of enemy
delegates would have given." 30 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
went to Paris at the end of World War I with his Fourteen Points,
including those dealing with national self-determination. 31 His
concept of self-determination
did not translate into
independence for all nationalities. On the one hand, point XI
called for economic independence and territorial integrity for
the Balkan states based on "established lines of allegiance and
nationality." 32 President Wilson's following point, however,
declared that the nationalities falling under Turkish rule should
be allowed not independence, but security and autonomy.3 3 The
other delegates in Paris did not, or for domestic political

29. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that "respect for the rule of law
internationally is at the heart of the Charter .... ").
30. ARTHUR WALWORTH, WILSON AND HIS PEACEMAKERS 104 (W.W. Norton & Co.

1986).
31. See Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, Address to Congress (Jan.
8, 1918), in THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 536 (Arthur S. Link et al. eds., 1984)

available at http://wwi.Iib.byu.edu/index.php/President_- Wilson%27sFourteenPoints
[hereinafter Fourteen Points]. Of particular current interest is point V (calling for an
approach to the resolution of questions of sovereignty that is based on a balance of the
interests of the existing government and the populations within the states), point IX ("A
readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines
of nationality."), point X ("The peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the
freest opportunity to autonomous development."), and point XI (advocating for
independence of Balkan states). Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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purposes would not, follow Wilson's Points. 34 As a result, the
final Treaty of Versailles resolutely forbade borders to be drawn
with ethnicities in mind, when the states containing those
ethnicities were among the losing parties of the World War.
Specifically, the Treaty forbade German Austrians from uniting
with Germany. 35 Wilson himself, not following "recognizable
lines of nationality" that point IX called for, ceded German
South Tyrol to Italy. 36 Despite any good intentions he had,
therefore, even Woodrow Wilson carried on the tradition
whereby "the law of recognition, in respect of states, was
inferable only from the ill defined practices of individual states
which were as much the product of caprice as of regard for
37
principle."
b. The Issue of Minorities: Championing Rights and Exploiting
Nationalistic Sentiments
Whether carefully or capriciously drawn, the borders of new
states were bound to include minority peoples, and there is little
in the League Covenant that addresses the rights of minority
peoples within established or newly formed countries. 38 The
exception is article 22, paragraph 6, which acknowledges34. See, e.g.,
WALWORTH, supra note 30, at 403 ("Although [British Prime Minister
Lloyd George and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau] had just given
[American Norman] Davis to understand that they agreed upon the necessity of telling
their peoples the facts, actually they were unwilling to face the political consequences of
such a course."); see alsoJOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
PEACE 47 (Harcourt, Brace & Howe 1920) (describing the "blind passions of 'antiGerman' resentment with which the public of all allied countries were still inspired" and
providing evidence that any concerns of Lloyd George and Clemenceau had might have
been well-founded).
35. See Treaty of Versailles art. 80, July 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 118, available at
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/ver31.html
("Germany
acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers
which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with
the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."); see also KEYNES, supra note 34, at
51-52 (suggesting that the wording of the Treaty with regards to Austria and Germany
were designed to appeal to Wilson's sensibilities while giving France its desired veto over
any unification).
36. See generally Fourteen Points, supra note 31.
37. MALBONE W. GRAHAM, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RECOGNITION OF
STATES 1, 1 (William S. Hein 2005) (1933).
38. See League of Nations Covenant, art. 22(6) (stating that some regions are
integral parts of the larger state, "subject to the safeguards . . . in the interests of the
indigenous population.").
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foreshadowing the words of Bothe and Marauhn 9-that some
territories are best incorporated into larger entities "owing to...
their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of
civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory [newly formed, independent state] ... subject to
the ...interests of the indigenous population." 40 For the most
part, it was the "Minority Treaties" that addressed the issue of
minority peoples in the newly formed states. One example is the
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, in which the Sudetenland, with
its sizable German-speaking population, was ceded to
Czechoslovakia. 41 This was done despite the principles of
Wilson's Fourteen Points regarding drawing borders along ethnic
lines and despite warnings from the U.S. Commission to the Paris
Peace Conference of conditions of the German minority in their
new state. These conditions, reviewed next, seem to parallel the
circumstances of minorities in South Ossetia and Kosovo.
The U.S. Commission warned that granting Czechoslovakia
all the territory it was demanding would create a situation where
discontented Germans would be living within the state of
Czechoslovakia but with sympathetic Germans right over the
border, 42 as is the case with Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo or
Russians in South Ossetia. 43 The Commission also reported that
Czechoslovakian soldiers had fired on German crowds in several
towns, and that these were acts that would not be easily forgiven
and would be resented by the Germans on both sides of the
border. 44 Britain's Lord Runciman visited the Sudetenland and
39. See generally Bothe & Marauhn, supra note 27 (suggesting that there are cases
where nations may benefit by working as a unit rather than separately).
40. League of Nations Covenant, art. 22(6).
41. See Treaty of Peace with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye), art. 27, 1 6, Sept. 10,
1919 (describing the revised border).
42. See Alfred de Zayas, Anglo-American Responsibilityfor the Expulsion of the Germans,
1944-48, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN 20TH CENTURY EUROPE, 239, 245 n.1 I (Steven Bela
Vardy et al. eds., 2000), available at http://www.ostdeutsches-forum.net/en/PDF/
ZayasAnglo-American-EN.pdf (quoting ARCHIBALD COOLIDGE, 12 PAPERS RELATING TO
THE
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
273,
available at

http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1919Parisvl 2).
43. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK:

(providing

map

of

Georgia,

including

South

Ossetia

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACrBOOK:

and

Russia);

GEORGIA

CENTRAL

KoSovO, https://www.cia.gov/

library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html
(last visited July 14,
(providing map and brief history of Kosovo).
44. See De Zayas, supra note 42, at 245 n.1 1 (quoting Archibald Coolidge:
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reported back to his government the oppression that the
Germans were experiencing in Czechoslovakia. 45 Among the
conditions that raised concerns for him were the large number of
non-German-speaking Czechoslovakian officials and police
dispatched to German districts; Czechoslovakian agricultural
colonists settling in the midst of German populations as the
result of land reform; state contracts being allocated more
heavily to Czechoslovakian rather than German firms; and state
work and relief programs favoring Czechoslovakian over German
citizens. 46 The minorities in Kosovo and South Ossetia have
similarly alleged abuses of the governing majority. 47
The developments that concerned the U.S. Commission and
Runciman combined a number of forces that moved the world
toward its Second World War: A humiliated former great power
in a depressed global economy used the mis-governance of a
minority population in a newly created state as an excuse to
regain some of the territory and countrymen it had lost when it
collapsed two decades earlier. Championing the rights of the
minority Germans in Czechoslovakia took on nationalistic and
ethnic characteristics, and what began as a concern for the rights
of minority populations ended as a devastating conflict.
c.

Alliances: Choosing Sides to Determine Self-Determination

At the end of the nineteenth century, some thought that
devastating conflicts were a thing of the past with globalization
For the Bohemia of the future to contain within its limits great numbers of
deeply discontented inhabitants who will have behind them across the border
tens of millions of sympathizers of their own race will be a perilous experiment
and one which can hardly promise success in the long run.).
45. See id., at 243 (quoting Lord Runciman).
46. See Id.
47. SeeJuliane Kokott, Human Rights Situation in Kosovo 1989-1999, in Kosovo AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:

A LEGAL ASSESSMENT 23 (Christian Tomuschat ed.,

2001) (discussing the confiscation of Albanian property, the closing of minority schools,
mass dismissal of Albanians from their jobs, and the destruction of religious and cultural
monuments); SABRINA PETRA RAMET, BALKAN BABEL:
THE DISINTEGRATION OF
YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE DEATH OF TITO TO THE WAR FOR KOSOvO 308 (1999) (listing

evidence of Albanian repression during the Presidency of Slobodan Milogevie, including
the termination of Albanian-language schools; the firing of Albanians from jobs; the
confiscation of land; and the arrest and beating of Albanians); Clifford J. Levy, Russia
Declares Its Recognition of Two Enclaves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at Al (providing a
limited view of South Ossetian life under Georgian rule, including road checkpoints and
having to provide documentation "under the hostile gaze of soldiers.").
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replacing nationalism and ethnic pride. 48 That globalization,
though, included alliances that quickly devolved into the Great
War after a regional dispute in the Balkans brought in players
from around the globe. 49 The alliances did not end with World
War I, and when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia to claim the
Sudetenland and allegedly to liberate the ethnic Germans from
Czechoslovakian oppression, it set in motion tensions and
aggression that would result in its second major defeat of the
twentieth century. The resulting devastation reinvigorated the
desire for an organization of nations that would prevent the
Eliminating, or at least
scourge of war from recurring.
mitigating, alliances appears to have been part of that
organization's purpose,5 0 manifest in article 103 of the U.N.
Charter, which gives the United Nations supremacy over5 any
conflicting obligations and alliances between member states. '
Self-determination may complicate the task of eliminating
alliances, as Robert Lansing, the U.S. Secretary of State during
the formation of the League of Nations, suggested when he
contemplated "'the confusions that could arise from devotion to
the general principle of self-determination. To what political
unit should it be applied,' he queried, 'to a race, to a region, or

ERINNERUNGEN EINES
48. See, e.g., STEFAN ZWEIG, DIE WELT VON GESTERN:
EUROPAERS,14-18, 225-29 (S. Fischer Verlag ed., 1990) (reflecting on the societal
advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and a certain panEuropean nationality); see also KEYNES, supra note 34, at 9-26 (providing a primarily
economic, but also social, examination of Europe before World War I: "What an
extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an
end in August, 1914!").
49. See generally Bainbridge Colby, For Certain Peace: Alliances Have Failed So
Regularly, a League of Nations Deserves a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1919 (advocating a
League of Nations to supplant an oft-failed policy of alliances); World War I. Alliance
System, THECORNER.COM, http://www.thecorner.org/hist/wwi/alliance.htm (last visited
July 14, 2009) (describing the various pre-World War I alliances, starting with Germany's
alliance with Austria and Russia intended to isolate France and leading eventually to the
Italy-Germany, Austria-Italy alliances and Britain-France alliance, among others).
50. See United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, Mission Statement, available at
http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/39/187/lang,english/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009)
(describing one of its missions to be "to help counter the forces that fuel polarization
and extremism").
51. See U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.").
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to a community?"' 52 Lansing's concern implied that states may
not agree on how to apply the principle of self-determination.
Differences in application of the principle could result not only
in confusion but in potential conflict as different states ally
themselves with groups seeking self-determination or with other
states seeking to suppress secessionist desires of minorities.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, it may have seemed that
such concern was moot.53 Early in the United Nations' decade of
international law, running from 1990 to 1999, the Special
Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization ("Special
Committee on the Charter") issued a report, with one of its
purposes being to ensure that the United Nations would
maintain and strengthen its relevance. 54 Perhaps it seemed that
its relevance, as expressed in the Charter's preamble, 55 was
waning as the Cold War imploded and traditional aggressors
became good global citizens. 56 During the Cold War, the
Security Council was essentially paralyzed in the face of regional
conflicts that "pitt[ed] proxies of the superpowers against each
other." 57 The United Nations nonetheless appears to have
maintained its relevance, as Kosovo and South Ossetia threaten
to pit superpowers and their allies against one another again as

52. WALWORTH, supra note 30, at 109 (quoting then-U.S. Secretary of State Robert
Lansing).
53. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, After the Cold War:
Views from Africa; Stranded by
Superpowers, Africa Seeks an Identity, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1992, at Al (describing the
predicament of African countries that could no longer rely on Washington-Moscow
rivalries to bring African countries to the top of the global economic agenda).
54. See G.A. Res. 44/23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/23 (Nov. 17, 1989) (declaring the
period as the United Nations Decade of International Law); see also Report of the Special
Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
Organization, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 33, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/45/33 (1990)
(reporting that one representative "noted that there was a general agreement on the
need to enhance the role of the Organization" given the "improvement in the
international climate").
55. See U.N. Charter pmbl. ("[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and .. . to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . ").
56. See Perlez, supra note 53 (reviewing the post-cold war Soviet-American
operation cooperation that helped end the Angolan civil war).
57. CHESTERMAN, supra note 16 at 21.
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each side advances its agenda by pursuing-or resisting58
statehood for the two territories.
4.

The State of Statehood

The United Nations never adopted a Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of States, but the debate during drafting of the
Declaration makes clear that the prevailing sentiment was that
any reference to a state meant a state that already existed. 59 The
Treaty of Versailles, on the other hand, dealt with newly created
states, limited to those territories that belonged to the defeated
parties of World War J.60 There were three elements to be
considered for statehood: 1) the proposed state was for
identifiable peoples; 2) disputed borders were to be determined
by plebiscite; and 3) ethnic groups too small or dispersed were to
be granted the protection of special minorities, supervised by the
League of Nations. 61 Noteworthy is the fact that this scheme "did
not provide a legal basis to all populations seeking more than a
certain degree of participation in the governance of their
territories." 62 Hence, a Kurdish delegation was unsuccessful in
making its case for a Kurdish state to the San Francisco
Conference in 1945, despite the fact that the people was
identifiable, and the territory was within a definable area and by
no means too small. 63 The size of its territory, in fact, covering
58. See MARK MACKINNON, THE NEW COLD WAR 99 (2007) (describing the RussiaGeorgia relationship in personal as well as national terms).
59. See Summary Record of the 24th Meeting, [1949] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 171-72,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.24 (debating the meaning of "State" in the phrase, "Every State
has the right to exist and to preserve its existence.").
60. See Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement, 43
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 99, 108-09 (1994) (explaining that the conquered territories were
the only ones over which the Allies had authority); see also CHESTERMAN, supra note 16,
at 409 (noting that there was no move to address statehood claims of the victors'
colonies).
61. See Whelan, supra note 60, at 100-01 (suggesting that Wilson's concern for
oppressed ethnic nationalities influenced the three elements); see also Treaty of
Versailles, supra note 35, art. 22 (identifying specific territories and suggesting the
appropriate-in the view of the Allies-governance for them).
62. CHESTERMAN, supra note 16, at 410 (citing the denial for self-determined
realignment to Sweden of the Aaland Islands as an example of limitations on
sovereignty).
63. See Histoy of Kurdistan, LIVELEAK-COM, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=
135_1200571325 (last visited July 14, 2009) (chronicling the history of the Kurdish
region); The Creation of a Kurdish State in the Middle East, Walworth Barbour American
International School in Israel, http://www.wbais.org/-timemun/issues/td2.htm (last
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portions of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey64 may have worked
against it, since these other states had conflicting claims to the
area.
While a people's separate, identifiable culture, language and
religion do not guarantee its right to external self-determination,
as seen in the Kurdistan case, a state's historical claim to a
territory does not guarantee its right to that territory, as viewed
by the United Nations. The International Court of Justice made
note of this when, considering the Philippines' claim over North
Borneo, Judge ad hoc Franck wrote, "historic title, no matter how
persuasively claimed on the basis of old legal instruments and
exercises of authority, cannot except in the most extraordinary
circumstances prevail in law over the rights of non-self-governing
people to claim independence and establish their sovereignty
through the exercise of bona fide self-determination."6 5 Judge ad
hoc Franck observed that the people of North Borneo had chosen
to associate "with other peoples in their region with whom they
fe[lt] ties of ethnic association, heritage, language, religion,
culture, economic relationship, and ideals and objectives." 66 In
this case, the people won their right to disengage from the
established state; the state, therefore, lost its case for territorial
integrity.
a. Pays Sans Fronti!res

67

The Kurdistan case demonstrates that Kosovo and South
Ossetia are not outliers with regards to the disconnect between
visited July 14, 2009) (describing the World War II Allies acceptance of Turkey's borders
after its takeover of some Kurdish areas); see also akaKurdistan.com, Story Map,
http://www.akakurdistan.com/kurds/stories/index.html (last visited July 14, 2009)
(showing a map of the proposed state).
64. See David Romano, Safe Havens as PoliticalProjects: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan, in
STATES WITHIN STATES: INCIPIENT POLITICAL ENTITIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 154
(Paul Kingston & Ian Spears eds., 2004). See also Who are the Kurds?,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inad/daily/feb99/
kurdprofile.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (giving a general background of the people).
65. CHESTERMAN, supra note 16, at 431-32. For Judge ad hoc Franck's opinion, see
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan & Pulau Sipadan, Application by the Philippines for
Permission to Intervene, 2001 I.C.J. 575, 652 (Oct. 23) (separate opinion ofJudge ad hoc
Franck) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7712.pdf
[hereinafter
"Franck Opinion"].
66. Franck Opinion, supra note 65, at 657 (quoting the U.N. Secretary-General's
finding); CHESTERMAN, supra note 16, at 433-34.
67. "Countries Without Borders."
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political boundaries and ethnic make-up or aspirations. The
political boundaries of states do not always reflect a logical
boundary based on the ethnicity of the populations who live in a
given area. 68
Lands that were conquered, colonized, and
subsequently granted independence reflect this phenomenon. 69
As African nations formed from former colonies, for example,
they maintained, for the most part, the arbitrary political borders
that their erstwhile colonizers had drawn many years earlier
without consideration of the continent's populations. 70 Political
borders, as a result, cut across and split some ethnic groups,
while throwing together other, disparate groups. 71 Despite calls
for redrawing the borders in Africa, 72 the political boundaries
have held.

73

Two examples illustrate how the international community
resists territories' petitions for recognition as independent states.

68. See S. JAMES ANAYA,

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

107-08

(Oxford University Press 2004) (1996) (finding that the colonial territorial unit was
maintained during the decolonization process); see also Rush-Bagot Pact, 1817 and
Convention of 1818, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/
jd/91716.htm (last visited July 14, 2009) (providing a brief overview of the settlement of
the U.S.-Canadian border at the forty-ninth parallel for much of the Western part of the
countries).
69. See ANAYA, supra note 68, at 108; ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES:
SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD 41 (1990) (noting
that "[t]he sovereigns have changed and the Europeans have left but the territorial
jurisdictions they created are exactly as before in most cases.").
70. See ANAYA, supra note 68, at 107-08 (noting that redressing historical violations
of self-determination takes into account new political orders based on the artificial
colonial boundaries); see also Lydia Polgreen, Qaddafi, as New African Union Head, Will
Seek Single State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A9 (reporting on Libyan President
Muammar el-Qaddafi's vision of taking the various African states, with their arbitrary
post-colonial borders, and shaping them into one unified state).
71. See ANAYA, supra note 68, 108 (finding that the colonial territorial unit was
maintained during the decolonization process).
72. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Chamey, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East
Timor, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 455 (2001) (suggesting that the international
community should review its self-determination policy in non-colonial situations);
Africa's Outdated Colonial BoundariesMust Be Redrawn, U. PENN. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 26,
1994, at 7B (arguing that a new generation of Africans are comfortable with their ethnic
and tribal background and should redraw national borders rather than live with violence
that springs from tribalism).
73. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Nigeria, http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm (last visited July 19, 2009) (relating the evolution of Nigeria
from a colony of the United Kingdom to an independent country with multiple ethnic
regions, and the unsuccessful attempt of one of them, Biafra, to establish its own
independence).
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The first, Kurdistan, has already been discussed. The territories
of the Somalis, an African example, presents an essentially
opposite case. Britain's "Bevin Plan" of the 1940s proposed, but
failed, to unite the territories of the Somali people into a single,
independent nation. 74 In 1960, Britain granted independence to
Somaliland and shortly after, Italy granted independence to its
former colony, Somalia. v5 The two newly dependent states briefly
attempted unification, but Somaliland soon recognized that such
an arrangement was not to its benefit. 76 In the meantime,
however, the United Nations had recognized Somalia as the
unified two former colonies. 77 When Somaliland attempted to
claim its independence from Somalia, its declaration fell on deaf
international ears. 78 Hence, to the international community,
Somaliland continues as part of Somalia, even though the two
provinces had been separate colonies belonging to two different
empires at the time of their independence. 79 Matt Bryden,
74. See Ismail Ali Ismail, Ethiopia and Somalia: Missed Opportunities and Some
Challenges, WARDHEERNEWS.COM, July 6, 2005, http://wardheernews.com/articles/July/
7_Somalia%20&%2OEthiopiaGeeldoon.htm (describing what the author views as the
unfortunate selection of Italy as the administrative trustee during the decolonizing
period rather than Britain, which, the author believes, could have unified the region).
75. See Matt Bryden, State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge of
International Recognition, in STATES WITHIN STATES, supra note 64 (providing a
chronology and commentary on the independence, unification and attempted
Somalia, BBC NEWS,
separation of Somalia and Somaliland); see also Timeline:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1072611.stm (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (listing the
main events in Somalia's history).
76. See generally Bryden, supra note 75. Somaliland argues that the unification was
not consummated, because rather than a single treaty, significantly different documents
were signed by the two legislatures. Id.
FOR AFRICA,
U.N.
ECON.
COMM'N
see
also Somalia,
77. See
id.;
(last visited
http://www.uneca.org/aisi/NICI/countryprofiles/Somalia/somab.htm
July 14, 2009) (noting that the Republic of Somaliland is not recognized by any
government, although it maintains a stable existence).
78. See Bryden, supra note 75; see also Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Statement Reaffirms Council's Commitment to Peace in Somalia, U.N. Doc.
SC/6985 (Nov. 1, 2001) (reaffirming the Security Council's commitment to Somalia's
"sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity."). Djibouti, the
former French Somaliland, or more formally, the French Territory of Afars and Issas,
avoided this by not gaining its independence, as Djibouti, until 1977. See CENTRAL
DJIBOUTI,
FACTBOOK
2010:
THE
CIA WORLD
AGENCY,
INTELLIGENCE
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dj.html (last visited
July 14, 2009). At the time of independence, the people of Djibouti rejected unification
with Somalia. See Bryden, supra note 75, at 171. Britain had granted Kenya, with its
Somali-inhabited territory, independence in 1963. See id.
79. Respecting the integrity of international borders at the moment of
independence is consistent, not only with U.N. practice, but with the charter of the
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author and former director of International Crisis Group's Horn
of Africa Project, suggests that an independent Somaliland
should be recognized, since peace has not resulted from
combining the two countries after the end of their respective
colonial periods.80 He feels that the recent history of Somaliland
as a functioning entity supports its independence movement. 8'
The United Nations seems uninterested in pursuing such a
82
path.
These examples of Kurdistan and Somaliland demonstrate
the reluctance of the United Nations to redraw borders to match
demographics, the desires of minorities for independence, or
even populations that want to correct an ill-conceived
unification. 3 They also demonstrate very different situations of a
similar problem with independence movements: While Kurdistan
would unite a people divided across political units, Somaliland
would divide what appears to be a single people into multiple
political units.
Both cases highlight the need to define a
"people."

African Union as well. See Bryden, supra note 75, at 170; see also African Union
Constitutive Act art. 4(b) (declaring as one of its principles "respect of borders existing
on achievement of independence.").
80. See Bryden, supra note 75, at 171-72 (describing the Somali government's
violence toward Somaliland and explaining it as the reason for Somaliland's separation
from Somalia). See generally Abdulazez Al-Motairi, Somaliland Recognition & UN
Trusteeship on Southern Somalia: The Only Solution to Somalia, AMERICAN CHRONICLE, Dec.
21, 2008, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/85630 (citing an abuse of
power against tribes and communities for a conflict that the author feels can be resolved
only through recognition of Somaliland).
81. See Bryden, supra note 75, at 171-72 (suggesting that the timing of its petition
for independence is causing a forced unification based on a technicality). See generally
Al-Motairi, supra note 80 (calling on the world to recognize Somaliland, which
attempted to gain recognition shortly after the failed attempt at integration with Italian
Somalia).
82. See, e.g., U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR AFRICA, supra note 77 (confirming that
Somaliland is not recognized by any state); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Statement Reaffirms Council's Commitment to Peace in Somalia, U.N. Doc.
SC/6985 (Nov. 1, 2001) (characterizing Somaliland leadership as one of the groups
opposed to a peace initiative).
83. See S.C. Res. 541, U.N. Doc S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983) (deploring "the
declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the
Republic of Cyprus"); Thant, supra note 15, at 36 (articulating his belief that the United
Nations will never accept secession of a part of a member state).
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b. What Is a "People?"
The United Nations, while not recognizing political borders
redrawn by ethnic demographics, recognizes in the Charter that
peoples within political borders have a right to selfdetermination.8 4 This right is bestowed upon a "people" that is
distinguishable from the population of the larger state in which
the people live.8 5 "People" is otherwise undefined and therefore
left to case-by-case and ad hoc analysis. Scholars and statesmen
have offered various suggestions for defining a "people." Dr.
Gerd Seidel, Faculty of Law at Humboldt Universitat, Berlin,
uses, first, a subjective requirement: The group in question must
identify itself as a people. 86 JudgeJuliane Kokott, Court of Justice
of the European Communities, articulates objective elements
"such as a separate culture, possibly a separate language or
ethnic origins different from the majority population in the
State." 87
Author John A. Perkins notes, however, that
Switzerland, its separate linguistic communities notwithstanding,
is one people. 88 The U.S. Supreme Court gave a context-driven
definition:
[W]hile the word "people" may mean the entire body of the
inhabitants of a state; or the state or nation collectively in its
84. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (stating that one of the purposes of the United
Nations is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... "). This recognition of
self-determination does not extend to a contiguous unit when the demographic territory
extends across multiple political states, as in the case of Kurdistan.
85. See Kokott, supra note 47, at 6 (citing KARL DOEHRING 333 VOLKERRECHT: EIN
LEHRBUCH (1999)).
86. See Gerd Seidel, A New Dimension of the Right of Self-Determination in Kosovo, in
KOSOVO AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT 205 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 2001) (analyzing the definition of a "people" as related to the
inhabitants of Kosovo and requiring that the group identify itself as a people). See
generally Sophia Kishkovsky, Conflict Tests Ties Between Georgian and Russian Orthodox
Churches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at A5 (describing the reaction of the Russian and
Georgian Orthodox Churches, which see the two groups as having "centuries of political
and economic ties").
87. Kokott, supra note 47, at 6.
88. See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 77; see also, Stanislav V. Chernichenko & Vladimir
S. Kodiar, Ongoing Global Legal Debate on Self-Determination and Secession: Main Trends, in
SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE-REGIONAL APPRAISALS 75,
78 (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003) ("a common language, for instance, is not necessarily
inherent in a people"). He also argues that "[a] group does not necessarily constitute a
'people' by its own definition." Id. at 81. This suggests that the subjective criterion is not
a necessarily overriding one.
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political capacity; or the ruling power of the country; its
meaning.., taken in connection with the words "colony"
and "district," covers in our judgment any insurgent or
insurrectionary
"body of people acting together,
undertaking and conducting hostilities," although its
89
belligerency has not been recognized.
Such a definition may not be what the United Nations had
in mind, but it is a propos to the current discussion. It is the
"acting together" and "conducting hostilities" against the
recognized state that create a tension within the U.N. framework;
for while the self-determination of the "people" is to be
respected, so is the "territorial integrity" 90 of the state, leading to
conflicts such as those within Kosovo and South Ossetia.
c. Origins and Implications of the Self-DeterminationTerritorial Integrity Tension
The tension between self-determination and territorial
integrity did not originate with the United Nations. It goes back
at least as far as the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ushered
in the rise of the modern state. 9 1 Concurrent with this political
development was the development of naturalist thinking, in
which European theorists began viewing natural law not as a
universal moral code, but rather as two sets of natural rights,
those of the individual and those of the state. 92 Gerd Seidel
reasons that peoples hold the right to self-determination, while
states hold all other fundamental rights. 93 Self-determination,
then, cannot lead to secession without either the assent of the
state or the infringement of the state's rights. Noting the fact
that there is no terra nullius in today's world, Seidel suggests two
conclusions to be drawn regarding secession: 1) only extreme
89. United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1897) (referring to
insurgents in Cuba against Spain, and dealing with the vessel the Three Friends,which
was used in filibustering activity).
90. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
91. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 68, 19-20 (describing the Treaty of Westphalia and
the emergence of the modern state). But see Daniel Nexon, Zeitgeist? The New Idealism in
the Study ofInternational Change, 12 REV. INT'L POL. ECON., 700, 706-07 (arguing that the
Treaty of Westphalia reflected changes that were already underway and that state
sovereignty was a movement not concurrent with the treaty).
92. See ANAYA, supra note 68, at 20 (discussing the effect of the individual/state
dichotomy on the tradition of Western liberal thought).
93. See Seidel, supra note 86, at 203.
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circumstances can legally and admissibly allow a secession that
would impair the territorial integrity and political unity of an
existing state, and 2) a state cannot rely on its legal interests to
prevent a secessionist movement, if the state has denied a people
within its borders the right to self-determination and if it has
94
discriminated against a portion of its population.
Seidel uses the term "state" to refer to the political unit.
Murat Belge, the Turkish scholar, recognizes "state" and
"nation" as separate concepts. 95 The Swiss diplomat Emmerich
de Vattel merged the terms in the eighteenth century, using
them interchangeably, 96 but some distinguish the terms "state"
and "nation." Belge observes, for example, that "[t]o set up a
state is easy, but to create a nation is extremely difficult." 97 The
distinction between the two is important when attempting to
determine the legal status of a people vis-A-vis states. Self-

94. See id. at 207-210 (considering the circumstances that justify secession and
applying them to Kosovo, finding that "[d]ue to its persistent policy of refusing to grant
autonomy and due to the reprisals against the Kosovo Albanians, Belgrade forfeited its
chance of keeping Kosovo under Yugoslav sovereignty."); see also Dugard & Raie, supra
note 26, at 94-95, 106 (referring to implicit provisions in the 1970 Declaration and
Vienna Declaration "that States are entitled to resist attempts at unilateral secession by
peoples within their borders if they are carried out in the absence of special
circumstances"). Dr. Seidel apparently would argue that whatever special circumstances
allowed the break-up of Yugoslavia should also allow the further break-up of Serbia. See
Seidel, supra note 86, at 214 ("[T]he people of Kosovo has the same right as the other
peoples of the former Yugoslavia to secede from the Yugoslav State ...."). He likewise
would hold Kosovo Albanians to the same standard regarding minority rights. In
defending against the argument that Kosovar Albanians might abuse minorities in
Kosovo, if given independence, Seidel counters that the international community
should "demand that the Kosovo Albanians respect the minority rights they themselves
fought for." Id. at 214,
95. See Sabrina Tavernise, On the Bosporus, a Scholar Tells of Sultans, Washenvomen
and Snakes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at A5 (contrasting the national identity of the
Ottomans with the emphasis on "Turkishness" of the state).
96. See ANAYA, supra note 68, at 20-21. Franz Tamayo, Bolivian delegate to the
League of Nations, "endeavored to differentiate between communities attaining
statehood and those merely possessing the attributes of nationhood." GRAHAM, supra
note 37, at 25.
97. Sabrina Tavernise, supra note 95. Mr. Beige was referring specifically to the
creation of modern Turkey after World War I. Id. The country's founder, Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk looked toward the European model, disassembled the six hundred-yearold structure of the Ottoman state, changed the alphabet to Latin characters and
crushed the religious hierarchy. As a result, the political boundaries were set, but the
national identity, as reflected in language, culture and religion was suppressed. See
Sabrina Tavernise, In Turkey, Bitter Feud Has Roots in History, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at
A6.

2012 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1990
determination is a manifestation of a people seeing itself as a
distinct nation; secession is a desire of a people to cease being
part of an existing political state. 98 Professor S. James Anaya,
special rapporteur on the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, suggests that the
concept of the nation-state came from a mutually reinforcing
merger of "nation," which developed as a sociological identity,
and "state," which developed as a political community, supported
by a bureaucracy and defined by its territory. 99 Belge recognizes
the reality of the difference,10 0 as does the United Nations, which
implicitly requires that states allow their peoples to express
nationhood through self-determination. 10 1
The cultural, sociological, and ethnic entity, organized into
a political community is, according to Vattel, independent of all
other states and "should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of
that liberty which she inherits from nature." 10 2 Within Vattel's
understanding of the natural law of states is the belief that society
has the duty to 1) procure for its citizens the "necessities, the
comforts, and the pleasures of life," 2) make its citizens safe with
regards to property and justice, and 3) protect its citizens from
external violence. 10 3 Accepting these as duties of the state leads
to the question of whether the state loses its rights when it fails in
these duties. This is perhaps especially true when the state fails
to procure for its citizens' justice and security against violence98. The difference between self-determination and secession can be seen in the
minutes of the fifty-fourth session of the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination. After some discussion about the Committee's
traditional opposition to secession, which it defined as the "fragmentation of States," it
decided to welcome only "the right to self-determination, without specifying whether it
would take the form of autonomy or secession." International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
69-74, Mar. 19, 1999, 660 U.N.T.S.
195.
99. See ANAYA, supra note 68, at 21 (citing David Beetham, The Future of the Nation
State, in THE IDEA OF THE MODERN STATE (Gregor McLennan et al. eds., 1984); J.H.
SHENNAN, LIBERTYAND ORDER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: THE SUBJECT AND THE STATE,

1650-1800, at 3 (1986)).
100. See Tavernise, supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty in
creating a nation versus a state).
101. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 53/144, pmbl., Annex, para. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/53/144/Annex (Mar. 8, 1999).
102. ANAYA, supra note 68, at 21 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (Classics of International Law Series,

1916) (Charles G. Fenwick trans. of 1758 ed.)).
103. Id. at 20-21 (reviewing Vattel's concepts of the rights and obligations of states).
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the source of which may be internal as well as external. Vattel's
definition also leaves open the question of how homogeneous
the culture, society and ethnicity must be for the social unit to be
identified as a state.
The status of a state's rights when it fails in its duties to its
citizens is subject to interpretation. So, too, is the definition of a
cultural, sociological, and ethnic entity. These ambiguities
provide the international community with various options when
reviewing cases such as Kosovo and South Ossetia.
The
international community can a) defend the individual rights of a
cultural or ethnic group; b) uphold the rights of a political entity;
or c) attempt a reconciliation between the group and the entity
(the people and the state). Without a clear definition of a
people or clear consequences when a state is derelict in its duties,
other states have leeway in selecting the option that best serves
their own political objectives. The United Nations, with its many
members and their many political objectives, can, in theory,
become a neutral arbiter of conflicts such as those of Kosovo and
South Ossetia. It can either help them become independent
nation-states, or insist that they remain within larger, existing
states. Before deciding which outcome to support, the United
Nations must first determine whether it has jurisdiction to
involve itself in a people-state conflict resolution. It must then
apply the Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council and
General Assembly, and any applicable treaties to the specific facts
of a case. Part II reviews each case in turn. Following a review of
the facts, Part III will suggest how the international community
should address each case, focused on international legal goals,
rather than politics.
II. THE CASES OFKOSOVO AND SOUTH OSSETIA
A.

Kosovo

1. Two Claims to One Territory
During the six hundred years between the battle of Kosovo
on the Field of the Blackbirds in 1389 and the abolition of
Kosovo's autonomy in Serbia in 1989, the Albanian population

2014 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1990
became the distinct majority in the region of Kosovo. 10 4 It was
the Ottoman Empire, though, and not the Albanian population,
that was responsible for the emigration of ethnic Serbs from
Kosovo. When the Serbian principality was founded in 1830,
Kosovo was not included in the territory. 105 Not until the
founding of the Albanian State in 1912/13 was Kosovo, by that
time predominantly populated by Albanians, 10 6 incorporated, not
into Albania, but into the Serbian principality. 10 7 After World
War I, Wilson allowed Italy to expand its borders eastward by
absorbing territories that had populations of Slovene and Croat
majorities. 0 8 The remaining territory, the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes-to be renamed Yugoslavia in

1929109-

included Kosovo and its 400,000 Albanians." l0 Including Kosovo
worked toward fulfilling the Serbian plan of a Greater Serbia that
would include lands where Serbs currently lived as well as lands
where they may have lived or ruled in the past.'11 The League of
104. See Kokott, supranote 47, at2.
105. See id.
106. See Spiritus-temporis.com, Demographic History of Kosovo - Ottoman Rule,
available at http://www.spiritus-tempofis.com/demographic-history-of-kosovo/ottomanrule.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (citing GUSTAV WEIGAND, ETHNOGRAPHIE VON
MAKEDONIEN (1924) and providing snapshots of the demographics of Kosovo from the
fifteenth to early twentieth centuries).
107. See Kokott, supra note 47, at 2; see also Library of Cong., Places in the News:
Kosovo,
http://www.loc.gov/today/placesinthenews/archive/2008arch/20080219_
kosovo.html (last visited July 14, 2009) (providing a brief history of Kosovo, including
the pre and post-World War I period).
108. See CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS AFTERMATH 6
(Greenwood Press, rev. ed. 2004) (2004) (noting that Britain and France promised Italy
territorial compensation for joining the Entente); STEVE TERRET-, THE DISSOLUTION OF
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF

PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 20-21 (2000) (providing a
history of the area and the formation of Yugoslavia); see also Treaty of Peace with Austria,
supra note 41, art. 27, 1 2, 4 (regarding the frontiers of Austria with Italy and the SerbCorat-Slovene State).
109. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 72 (describing the country's construction after
World War I); TERRETr, supra note 108 at 21-22 (attributing the name change to King
Alexander).
110. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 72 (describing Serbian nation building in the
early twentieth century); see also RAMET, supra note 47 at 302 (referring to the 1912
conference of Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia that
discussed territorial changes in the Balkans); Places in the News: Kosovo, supra note 107
(mentioning the defeat of the Serbs in 1389).
111. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 72 (characterizing Serbian nation building as a
manipulation of nationalism to further gains in wealth); see also TERRETr, supra note
108, at 21 (noting that Slovenia and Croatia perceived the Serbian Radical Party's
passage of the 1921 founding constitution as a move toward attempts to create a Greater
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Nations denied the 1921 Kosovar petition to merge into
Albania, 112 and neither World War II nor Tito's National
Liberation Movement helped Kosovar Albanians achieve their
goal. 113 The opportunity, and apparently the desire, for Kosovo
to merge with Albania grew more remote after Yugoslavia split
ideologically from the Soviet Union and Kosovo was cut off from
14
Albania, which began associating with Russia and, later, China.'
Beginning in 1963, the status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia
improved, becoming a province and, with the 1974 Constitution,
equal to that of the other seven units of the Yugoslav
federation. 115
By the time the Serbs coerced a constitutional amendment
that essentially abolished the autonomy of the Kosovo province
in 1989,116 the United Nations had long established the right of
17
self-determination, at least in the context of post-colonialism."
The Kosovar Albanians, once incorporated into the Serbian
Serbia); Flashback to Kosovo War, July 10, 2006, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/5165042.stm ("Serbs consider Kosovo the cradle of their culture, religion
and national identity.").
112. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 72 (explaining that the Kosovars were unhappy
with the situation and that Serbia was encouraging the Albanians to emigrate to
Turkey). See generally G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated
History an Openingfor the IslamicJihad in Europe, available at http://lamar.colostate.edu/
~grjan/kosovohistory.html (last visited July 14, 2009) (providing an overview of the
region and the implication for globaljihad).
113. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 72-73 (describing both Serbs and Kosovars as
being disappointed with the Yugoslav state); see also TERRET', supra note 108, at 24
(reporting Tito's demand for "a Yugoslav 'policing' role in Albania, purportedly to
defend against the civil war in Greece though also to prevent unity between Albania and
Kosovo.").
114. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 73 (implying that the Kosovars might not have
wanted to join Albania's ideological associations with Russia and China); see also
CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY,

THE

CIA WORLD

FACTBOOK

2010:

ALBANIA,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/al.html
(last visited
July 14, 2009) (placing the Albanian alliance with the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1960
and its alliance with China from 1960 to 1978).
115. See ROGEL, supra note 108, at 73 (noting that while the development was
pleasing to the Albanians, the Serbs "fumed" at seeing their influence waning); see also
TERRET, supra note 108, at 26 (observing that the constitution's granting of autonomousregion status to Kosovo (and Vojvodina) was an irritant to Serb nationalists).
116. See Kokott, supra note 47, at 5 (describing the acceptance of the constitution
by Kosovo's parliament as being influenced by "massive military and police pressure").
117. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; see also Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc.
A/4358 (Dec. 14, 1960); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the
U.N. policy on self-determination and secession).
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principality, and later into Yugoslavia, could be considered a
separate people within the state, using Judge Kokott's
definition.' 18 As Kokott notes about the Kosovar Albanians, their
culture, religion, language and ethnicity are different from the
Serbs. 119 They were not, however, a former colony, putting
unilateral secession out of reach, based on the U.N. Charter and
0
subsequent resolutions.12
Author Sabrina Petra Ramet suggests that through its
various compositions, Yugoslavia may have lacked the
fundamentals to be a state, arguing that it fell short in its mode
of selecting leaders, division of power, political succession, and its
very justification for being. 12 1 Its legitimacy as a state would, in
turn, affect the legitimacy of intervention by the international
community:
If Yugoslavia was, indeed, a legitimate state,
Kosovo's fight for independence would be a purely internal
dispute, and the U.N. Charter would normally not bless
intervention. 22 On the other hand, if it was not a legitimate state
with legitimate territory, other states could more easily recognize
the units that had made up Yugoslavia as independent entities.
Complicating either scenario is the fact that two competing
factions, the Serbs and Albanians, claim the territory of Kosovo.
Adding to this complexity is the history of violence between Serbs
and Albanians in Kosovo, with each reporting violence
perpetrated by the other. Serbs reported Albanian violence
118. See Kokott, supra note 47, at 6-7 ("[T]heir culture including their religion is
different [from the Serbs] as they are Muslims, not Serbian Orthodox, their language is
not Serbian, but Albanian, and they are ethnically different from the Serbs.").
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (applying objective criteria to
Kokott's definition of a "people").
120. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action,
2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993)
(" [T]his shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States .... "). See generally SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE-REGIONAL APPRAISALS (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003) (exploring
the views among members of the United Nations regarding secession).
121. See RAMET, supra note 47, at 298-99 (suggesting that the constant state of
turmoil in both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Communist-era country was caused, in
part, by its disputable status as a state).
122. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.").

2009]

INDEPENDECEOF KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSETTIA

2017

toward Serbs, leading to the emigration of the latter from Kosovo
between 1877 and 1912 as well as more recently. 123 Once Serbs
had regained control of the territory, however, and despite the
Treaty for the Protection of Minorities, the Serbs, partly as a
result of following President Slobodan MilogeviC's vision of a
Greater Serbia, deprived Kosovar Albanians of rights, including
Albanian-language schools and publications. 124 In addition,
Serbs confiscated Albanian land and made plans to forcefully
125
transfer Albanian families from Kosovo to Turkey.
2.

Authority to Intervene

The U.N. Charter, reinforced by the 1970 Declaration,
commands that member states refrain from threatening or using
force against the territorial integrity of another state and refrain
from interfering with the purely domestic affairs of other
states. 126 In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, the territory was well
123. See RAMET, supra note 47, at 302, 306 (citing Serbian complaints of violent
confiscations of land and plundering of churches by the Albanians in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries and of Albanian rape and genocide of the Serbian people
in the 1980s). Albanian officials had denounced violence, but disappointments in the
West's lifting of sanctions on Serbia and the failure to provide for Kosovo in the Dayton
Peace Accords helped the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") institutionalize terror.
Actions such as attacks on Serbian police weakened the position of moderates such as
Ibrahim Rugova. See id. at 309; see also Kokott, supra note 47, at 3-4 (referring to Kosovar
Albanian terror as an impetus for Serb emigration from the area in the 1990s); Nicholas
Wood, Kosovo Smolders After Mob Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at Al 0 (describing
the violence perpetrated by each side on the other). The Security Council condemned
"all terrorist acts by any party," specifically citing the KLA. See S.C. Res. 1244,
9(b), 15
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (deciding that the international security
presence in Kosovo should "[d]emiliariz[e] the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
other armed Kosovo Albanian groups" and demanding "that the KLA and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions").
124. See RAMET, supra note 47, at 303 (describing the Belgrade government's
program of "denationalization" of the area); see also TERRETr, supra note 108, at 29
(attributing the repression of Kosovar Albanian's political and cultural rights to
Milogevie's exploitation of Serbian nationalist ambitions and observing that Milogevie's
impassioned nationalistic speech "enraged his mentor, [then] Serbian President Ivan
Stambolic"). But see Kokott, supra note 47, at 3 (discussing the 1981 demonstrations of
Kosovar Albanians and the resulting brutal police reaction, providing evidence that
ethnic tensions existed without the prompting of Milogevi6).
125. See RAMET, supra note 47, at 303 (explaining that the plans to transfer
Albanians were not carried out, due to the intervention of World War II).
126. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also 1970 Declaration, supra note 12, at 122
("Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States .... ").
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defined; the question was whether the territory contained two
states or one. Was Kosovo part of Serbia? The actions of the
League of Nations and the United Nations answered that
question in the affirmative: Kosovo was part of Serbia, and
Kosovar Albanian leaders accepted this opinion as late as 1999 at
the Rambouillet, France, peace conference. 127 If Kosovo was part
of Serbia, the Serbian-Albanian conflict was a domestic matter
and was ordinarily out of the jurisdiction of the United Nations.
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, though, gives the United
Nations authority to take measures when there is a "threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression .... "128 The
chapter neither permits nor prohibits the United Nations from
invoking Chapter VII when the breach to the peace stems from a
purely domestic matter. Thus, whether or not Kosovo was part of
Serbia and the conflict was completely domestic, the United
Nations could, and did, act under its Chapter VII authority when
it issued Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. Resolution
1160 called for a solution that recognized the rights of the
Kosovar Albanians and expressed support for greater autonomy
and self-administration for Kosovo. 129 Although the Resolution
does not explicitly say so, the Security Council's authority for the
13 0
Resolution derives from Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter.
Article 73 of that chapter would seem to address only a colonial
situation in which a territory is expected to eventually become
independent.' 31 The article, however, goes only so far as to
describe "peoples [who] have not yet attained a full measure of

127. See

RAMET,

supra note

47, at

317-18

(describing

the

"inauspicious

circumstances" of the conference and the Albanian willingness to sign an agreement
that offered autonomy rather than independence in order to retain Western support).
See generally Tony Karon, Kosovo: Chronicle of a Mess Foretold, TIME.cOM, Apr. 2, 1999,
(suggesting
that
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,22596,00.html
moderate ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova wanted to prevent further destruction
of Kosovo, but that the warring sides ultimately signed on to the agreement to avoid the
wrath of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")).
128. U.N. Charter art. 39.
129. S.C. Res. 1160, 11 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (calling on
Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanians to enter into a dialog that would have as its goal
greater Kosovo autonomy while maintaining the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia).
130. See U.N. Charter arts. 73-74 (listing the responsibilities in administering
territories).
131. See U.N. Charter art. 73 (referring to "territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government.. . ").
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self-government .... -132
Such a description would apply to
Kosovo, or more specifically, to the Kosovar Albanians. The
responsibilities of the governing entity are listed in the
subparagraphs of the article and include respecting the people's
culture; helping the people to advance politically and
economically; promoting education; and protecting them from
abuses. 133 Using Gerd Seidel andJudgeJuliane Kokott as guides,
34
the Kosovar Albanians would seem to qualify as a "people,"'
with Serbia 135 having responsibility for protecting the rights of
the Albanian minority. Seidel notes, too, that Kosovar Albanians
could claim minority rights under article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").136
Whether Serbia failed in its responsibility and whether there
are mitigating factors that should keep Kosovo within Serbia are
questions that will be reserved for Part III of this Note. For now,
it is sufficient to say that other states have allied themselves with
either Serbia or the Kosovar Albanians. While the United States,
European Union, and nations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization ("NATO") enthusiastically endorsed the proposal
132. Id.
133. See id. (recognizing "the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount").
134. See supra notes 86, 87, 119 and accompanying text (noting that the Kosovar
Albanians recognize themselves as a separate people and have a separate culture,
language, and ethnic origin). Seidel offers this caveat, however: "We must remember
... that we cannot be sure whether the criteria we encounter are acknowledged by all
States." Seidel, supra note 86, at 205.
135. To avoid confusion, the governing country will be referred to as Serbia, rather
than attempting to follow the progression resulting from the breakup of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
136. Seidel, supra note 86, at 205-06 (noting that "the existing minority rights and
the right to self-determination overlap in Kosovo."); see also ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 27
("In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language."). Yugoslavia offered notifications of derogations
from articles 12 (freedom of movement) and 21 (right to assembly) between 1989 and
1990. See ICCPR Declarations and Reservations, Yugoslavia, n.1, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm; see also Office of the U.N.
High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International
Human
Rights
Treaties
10
(June
9,
2004),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (listing Serbia and Montenegro as successor
signatories as of April 27, 1992); Montenegro Gets Serb Recognition, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5083690.stm
(last visited July 14,
2009)
(describing Serbia-Montenegro as the "last vestige" of the former Yugoslav federation
and reporting Montenegro's split from Serbia).
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for Kosovo's independence advanced by U.N. special envoy Marti
Ahtisaari, the Federation of Russia warned that allowing
independence would set a dangerous precedent for separatists
elsewhere. 137 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice succinctly
stated the U.S. position by saying, "Kosovo will never again be
part of Serbia. It's not possible."' 3 8 States have therefore set up
new alliances.
One alliance, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo ("EULEX"), has apparently not foreclosed any possibility,
undertaking its mission to strengthen the police, judicial and
customs systems within Kosovo 139 while managing to do so with

137. See Yuri Zarakhovich, Will Russia Block Kosovo Independence?, TIME.COM, May 23,
2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1624851,O0.html
(adding that
Russia also endorses Trans-Dniestria's efforts to break away from Moldova); see also
Chernichenko & Kotliar, supra note 88, at 86 (suggesting that military intervention on
behalf of secessionists "comes very close to advancing the controversial concept of
'humanitarian intervention' which practically all the [participants of the Moscow
Conference held under the auspices of the Consortium on International Dispute
Resolution] condemned as illegitimate and contrary to the U.N. Charter").
138. Zarakhovich, supra note 137. The language and sentiment of the Secretary of
State seem to parallel those of Dr. Seidel when he compares Serbia and Kosovo to
spouses ripe for divorce. See Seidel, supra note 86, at 213 ("Just as hostile spouses cannot
be forced to continue their relationship, Serbs and Kosovars cannot be compelled to
continue to live together within the boundaries of a single State."). Zarakhovich
suggests there may be another reason for the Secretary's and the West's position, namely
attempting to show that the West is friendly toward the Muslim world and playing that to
Russia's disadvantage. See Zarakhovich, supra note 137 ("The issue also has implications
for the image of the protagonists in the Islamic world: Helping Muslim Albanians win
independence may help the Western powers repair their image in the Muslim world,
whereas resisting the Albanians' secession will cause a lot of bad blood in the Muslim
world for Russia."). In this view, the West's motive for improved relations with the
Muslim world is arguably one of security. See, e.g., Victoria Burnett, Convictions and Key
Acquittals End Madrid Bomb Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A3 (reporting on the trial
of Islamic radicals for the 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madrid); John Cloud, 3
Lessons from London, TIME, July 18, 2005, at 38 (analyzing the 2005 London bus and
subway bombings and concluding that while mainstream Muslims may have hardened
against jihadists, the movement is so far-flung that it will be difficult to find them or
exert effective pressure on them). The London and Madrid bombings, however,
occurred despite the West's support of the Muslim population in Kosovo in the late
1990s. See generally Flashback to Kosovo's War, supra note 111 (explaining the NATO air
strikes against Serbia as an effort to end Serbia's persecution of the Kosovar Albanians).
139. See generally Arbana Vidishiqi, Kosovo at Another Crossroads, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 20, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/Content/commentary_
KosovoAnotherCrossroads/1351205.html
(characterizing the mission as one to
"mentor police, the judiciary, and customs officials" while remaining neutral-or
ambiguous-toward Kosovo's status); The Strategy, EULEX KOSOVO, http://www.eulexkosovo.eu/?id=27 (last visited July 14, 2009) (describing the functional, non-political
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the acceptance of both Kosovo and Serbia. 40 The mission was set
up, after initial opposition from both sides, 41 to work within
Security Council Resolution 1244, which reaffirmed the
territorial integrity of Serbia and the "substantial autonomy and
meaningful self-administration of Kosovo."' 142 Although the
European Council acknowledges its "European perspective," the
mission establishing EULEX refers only to "implementing a
The plan
settlement defining Kosovo's future status." 143
acknowledges the challenge of ensuring Serbian-minority human
The two sides have differing
rights within Kosovo. 144
interpretations of the plan, with the Serbs believing the plan will
respect Serbian territorial integrity and Kosovo believing EULEX
will help it move toward independence. 145 It appears, then, that
the initiative is built on an agreement based on conflicting
perceptions and that alliances are still active in the region,
leaving an unsure future, but a present that is arguably less
antagonistic than the past.
aspects of the mission: "monitoring, mentoring and advising" the police, judiciary and
customs).
140. See Jeremic: EULEX Deployed on Serbia's Terms, RADIO SRBIJA, Dec. 3, 2008,
http://glassrbije.org/E/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=5391&Itemid=2
6 [hereinafter "RADIO SRBIJA, Jeremic"] (reporting that Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk
Jeremic finds the current plan does not infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Serbia); Kosovo PM: EULEX in Accordance with the Constitution and Ahtisaari
Plan, NEW KOSOvA REPORT, Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.newkosovareport.com/
200812041465/Politics/Kosovo-PM-EULEX-in-accordance-with-the-Constitution-andAhstiaari-Plan.html [hereinafter "Kosovo PM"] (expressing support for the mission as
long it is implemented in accordance with the constitution that Kosovo unilaterally
adopted).
141. See generally Fatos Bytyci & Benet Koleka, Kosovo Again Opposes EULEX Plan;
Albania Airs Doubts, REUTERS, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
latestCrisis/idUSLP686174 (reporting on the opposition from Kosovo and Serbia and
that perceptions of the mission may not match the intention of U.N. Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon).
142. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 123, pmbl.
143. Council Joint Action on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo,
EULEX KOSOVO, 7, O.J. L 42/92 (2008) [hereinafter "Council Joint Action, EULEX
KOSOVO"].
144. See generally id.
145. Compare RADIO SRBIJA, Jeremic, supra note 140 ("He repeated that Ahtisaari's
plan has been buried in the [Security Council] and that the plan of the UN Secretary
General which does not infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia
is in effect now."), with Kosovo PM, supra note 140 ("[O]n behalf of the government,
[Prime Minister Hashim Thaqi] expressed once again the support for EULEX but under
the condition that this mission be implemented in accordance with the Ahtisaari Plan
and the Kosovo Constitution.").
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B.

South Ossetia

1. The Majority of South Ossetia
Russia had earlier promised Abkhazia, Georgia, to treat any
recognition of Kosovo's independence as a precedent for
recognizing the independence of other unrecognized states,
presumably including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 146 Conflating
Kosovo and South Ossetia is an easy and understandable
temptation. The Matryoshka configuration of Soviet UnionGeorgia-South Ossetia seems to nest in the same way as
Yugoslavia-Serbia-Kosovo, with the largest unit breaking into
smaller units and the smallest units trying to declare their
independence from the middle units. 147 In addition, both
Kosovo and South Ossetia have seen a shift in demographics,
with the minority of the governing state being a majority in the
48
would-be independent province.1
146. See Abkhazia Calls on Russia to Be Consistent on Kosovo Status, GLOBAL NEWS
WIRE, Dec. 24, 2007 (noting that prior to Kosovo's recognition by the international
community, Russia had taken the position that recognizing Kosovo's independence
would "entail[] the recognition of other unrecognized states"); Marc Champion,
Georgian Incident Deepens Russia Rift-Accusations are Traded Over HelicopterAttack as U.N.
Wraps Up Probe, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2007, at A8 (reporting on a U.N. investigation of a
helicopter attack that Georgia claimed was authored by Russia); Russia: UN Hypocritical
Over Abkhazia and South Ossetia Independence, RUSsATODAY.COM, Aug. 29, 2008,
http://www.rnssiatoday.com/news/news/29648 (reporting Russia's allegations that the
United States and some European states had promised NATO protection if Georgia
launched an attack on South Ossetia). Russia claimed additional hypocrisy on the part
of the United States. In response to U.S. criticism of Russia entering Georgia during the
August 2008 war, Ambassador Churkin replied, "I would like to ask the distinguished
representative of the United States [about] Weapons of Mass Destruction. Have you
found them in Iraq yet or are you still looking for them?" Id.
147. For a study of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, see TERRET, supra note 108
(exploring the issues of self-determination and the role of the international community
in intra-State conflicts). Compare CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK
2010:
SERBIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ rb.html (last visited July 14, 2009) (chronicling the breakup of
Yugoslavia, with Serbia and Montenegro briefly remaining as the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, but with Montenegro completely breaking from Serbia in 2006 and the
insurgency of Kosovar Albanians attempting to break from Serbia in 1998), with
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2010: GEORGIA, supra note

2 (describing Georgia's independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the
subsequent complications of the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abhkazia).
148. Compare CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FAcrBOOK 2010:

GEORGIA, supra note 2 (identifying the Kosovo population as 88% Albanian, 7% Serbs),
with South Ossetia, supra note 5 (reporting that the 70,000 South Ossetians are "mostly"
Ossetian).
But
cf.
GlobalSecurity.org,
South
Ossetia-Background,
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There are differences, however, in the origins of their
demographics. Ossetians crossed the mountains into what is now
South Ossetia to escape the Russian expansion of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, while their northern countrymen
tended to align themselves with the Russians. 149 Ossetians now
make up a majority of the population of South Ossetia, but
probably with a smaller percentage than Albanians have in
Kosovo. 150
The South Ossetian majority held a unilateral
referendum on independence that split along ethnic lines, with
Ossetians voting for independence and South Ossetian
Georgians voting to remain with Georgia. 151 The Ossetians,
being the majority, won, but such a unilateral referendum for
secession is not recognized by the United Nations, as the Security
Council noted when Georgia's other would-be independent
52
province, Abkhazia, conducted a similar referendum.
2.

The Abkhazia Analogy

Many Security Council Resolutions regarding Abkhazia are
useful in reviewing the South Ossetian situation. Due to relative
calm until August 2008,153 the United Nations Observer Mission
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-3.htm (last visited July
14, 2009) ("South Ossetia includes many all-Georgian villages, and the Ossetian
population is concentrated in the cities of Tskhinvali and java.").
149. See South Ossetia, supra note 5 (describing the history of the Ossetians, the
creation of South Ossetia, and the Ossetian relationship with Russia).
150. See sources cited supra note 148; see also Georgia: A Toponymic Note Concerning
South Ossetia, PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES
10-11 (2007),
available
at
http://www.pcgn.org.uk/Georgia%20-%2South%200ssetia-anO7.pdf
(estimating that Ossetians make up about 67% of South Ossetia, based on the last Soviet
census of 1989, and noting that the total population is estimated at 70,000 as of 2007,
compared to 98,000 in 1989).
151. South Ossetia, supra note 5 (noting that the November 2006 referendum was
unrecognized).
152. SeeS.C. Res. 1287, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1287 (Jan. 31, 2000) (reiterating that
the Security Council "considers unacceptable and illegitimate the holding of self-styled
elections and referendum in Abkhazia, Georgia"); see also SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL
LA%, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 1, 16 (citing Anjouan and Somaliland of examples
of the international community not recognizing secession referenda, and noting that
while the will of the people is a necessary condition for independence, it is not a
sufficient condition to establish the right to independence).
153. See Molly Corso & KakhaJibladze, Uneasy Calm Prevails in South Ossetia Conflict
Zone, EURASIANET.ORG (Feb. 16, 2006), http://ww.eurasianet.org/departments/
insight/articles/eav021606.shtml (describing the fear and tension of the local
population); see also MACKINNON, supra note 58, at 98 (reporting that Georgian
President Shevardnadze had negotiated a 1992 settlement with South Ossetia).
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in Georgia ("UNOMIG") maintained no presence in South
Ossetia, 154 and there were similarly few Security Council
resolutions specifically on South Ossetia until 2008.
The
resolutions on Abkhazia, however, can illuminate the positions of
the United Nations regarding South Ossetia's relationship with
Georgia. Particularly pertinent to this Note are the resolutions'
repeated statements that the political status of Abkhazia must be
defined within the parameters of Georgia's sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity. 155
Absent specific
resolutions, Abkhazia is a good model for projecting the Security
Council's attitude toward a Georgia-South Ossetia separation. It
is also a good model for reviewing Russia's role in the
independence movement, since Russia is one of only two
countries, as of the time of this writing, that have recognized
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 156 When the
Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin,
formally
recognized
the provinces'
independence,
he
differentiated them from the Russian province of Chechnya,
which has its own aspirations to independence, 57 by claiming
that Russia had not stripped Chechnya of its autonomy, whereas
Georgia had done so in the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. 158 Analysis of Chechnya is beyond the scope of this Note,
154. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2008/631 (Oct. 3, 2008) (describing the limitation of
the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia's ("UNOMIG") mandate).
155. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1462, supra note 12, 2 (reaffirming "the commitment of all
Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia
within its internationally recognized borders, and the necessity to define the status of
Abkhazia within the State of Georgia in strict accordance with these principles").
156. The only other countries to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
Nicaragua and Venezuela. See Guy Faulconbridge & Michael Stott, Venezuela's Chavez
Draws
Closer
to
Moscow,
REUTERS,
Sept.
10,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5891W020090910?
(recognizing
as of Sept. 10, 2009); Ties Severed with Nicaragua, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at A12
(recognizing as of Sept. 3, 2008).
157. See Zarakhovich, supra note 137 (implying Russia's encouragement of the
separatist movements in Georgia may be due to Georgia's pro-NATO position).
158. See Russia Hands UN Sec Gen Official Letter of Recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Explains Position, REGNUM NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.regnum.ru/
english/1046774.html (reporting Ambassador Churkin's claims that Abkhazia and
South Ossetia have not been sources of terrorist threats to Georgia as Chechnya has
been to Russia). Recognizing independence of all the factions fighting would probably
mean recognizing Chechnya's independence from the Federation of Russia, unless
Russia could distinguish it from the other cases. Notably, the North Caucasus region of
the Federation of Russia is simultaneously experiencing inter-ethnic fighting. See
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but reviewing Abkhazia's history and relationship with Georgia is
instructive because of the similar circumstances of South Ossetia.
Despite Abkhazia's declaration of independence in 1992,
the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") continue to recognize Abkhazia
as an autonomous region of Georgia, rather than as an
independent state.1 59 South Ossetia has had a similar fate. The
initial optimistic and hopeful welcoming of Georgia into the
United Nations on July 6, 1992, in which the President of the
Security Council recognized Georgia's commitment "to the
160
peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force"
quickly gave way to the utilitarian language, in July 1993, of a
Council that was dealing with a tenuous cease-fire between the
16
central government of Georgia and the province of Abkhazia.
The cease-fire, signed almost a year earlier in Moscow, ensured
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. 62 The parties
to the agreement included the Federation of Russia,1 63 and the

GlobalSecurity.org, Independent Abhkazia, http://ww,.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/war/Abkhazia-4.htm (last visited July 14, 2009) [hereinafter "Independent
Abkhazia"]; see also Tony Karon, Has Georgia Overreached in Ossetia?, TIME, Aug. 9, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/printout/
0,29239,183229418322951831073,00.html# (reporting that Georgians had been
displaced from South Ossetia and that Georgia had signed a cease-fire agreement in the
1990s that left the region "effectively autonomous").
159. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 16, at 443-44 (noting that Abkhazia continued to
be recognized as part of Georgia despite its declaration of independence); see also supra
note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the Security Council's rejecting the
legitimacy of Abkhazia's referendum for independence).
160. S.C. Res. 763, U.N. Doc. S/RES/763 (July 6, 1992) ("Georgia's solemn
commitment to uphold the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, which include the principles relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and
the non-use of force, is noted with great satisfaction by the members of the Council.").
161. See S.C. Res. 849, U.N. Doc. S/RES/849 (July 9, 1993) (requesting that
member states provide observers for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement).
162. See President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/24542 (Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter "S.C. President's Note"] (announcing
that the "Moscow Agreement" ensured the territorial integrity of Georgia); see also
Department

of Political Affairs,

REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY

COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT 1989-1992, at 467, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.11 (2007),
available
at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoire/89-92/CHAPTER%208/
EUROPE/item%2018_Georgia_.pdf [hereinafter "REPERTOIRE OF PRAcTICE"] (assessing
the situation in Georgia and commenting on the statement by the President).
163. See REPERTOIRE OF PRACTICE, supra note 162 (reporting that the agreement
was signed by the President of the Federation of Russia).
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territory of Georgia was understood to include both Abkhazia
164
and South Ossetia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia was
populated by about forty-four percent Georgians, eighteen
percent Abkhaz and sixteen percent Russians. 165 Days after the
United Nations welcomed Georgia, the Abkhazian Supreme
Council declared effective independence from Georgia, a gesture
that no country recognized. 166 In August 1992, fighting began in
earnest between Georgia and the independence faction in
Abkhazia. By September 10 of that year, the Security Council
seemed reasonably satisfied that a political settlement would be
found. 167 It reaffirmed the internationally recognized borders of
Georgia and essentially treated the issue as one of ethnic
minorities. 168 At the same time, it recognized the "legitimate
authorities in Abkhazia." 169 By October 1, 1992, however, the
cease-fire had collapsed and full fighting resumed, with both
sides claiming human rights abuses. 70 For the next sixteen years,
the Security Council repeatedly drafted resolutions that at
various times called upon Abkhazia to improve human rights
164. The agreement specifically involved Abkhazia, but referred to Georgia's
internationally recognized borders. See id.
165. See Independent Abkhazia, supranote 158; see also HACELEHHE AEXA3H141 (The
Population of Abkhazia), http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnabkhazia.html (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009) (giving the breakout as forty-six percent Georgian, eighteen
percent Abkhaz, fourteen percent Russian, and fifteen percent Armenian).
166. See David Losaberidze et al., Local Government in Georgia, in DEVELOPING NEW
RULES IN THE OLD ENVIRONMENT:

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, IN THE

CAUCASUS AND IN CENTRAL ASIA 295, 309-10 (Igor Munteanu & Viktor Popa eds., 2001),
available at http://lgi.osi.hu/publicaions/2001/84/Ch5-Georgia.pdf (noting that on
July 23, 1992, "the Abkhaz Supreme Council reinstated the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925,
implying the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia").
167. See S.C. President's Note, supranote 162, para. 1 (expressing "satisfaction with
the efforts of the participants of the meeting aimed at achieving an immediate cease-fire,
overcoming the crisis situation and creating conditions for a comprehensive political
settlement .... ).
168. See id. para. 2 (reaffirming "the inadmissibility of any encroachment upon the
principle of territorial integrity and upon Georgia's internationally recognized borders,
and the necessity of respecting the rights of all ethnic groups in the region.").
169. Id.
170. Independent Abkhazia, supra note 158, para. 3 (reporting that each side accused
the other of ceasefire violations); see also President of the Security Council, Letter by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/24633 (Oct. 7, 1992) (noting that the
situation had deteriorated considerably and that fighting had resumed); Letter by the
Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/24641 (Oct. 8, 1992) (relaying reports from
reliable sources in Abkhazia of "mass executions of the Georgian civilian population,
widespread torture, rape and other atrocities").
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within its territory, to open a human rights office in Sukhumi, to
provide education in the native tongue of Georgians, and to
17 1
allow refugees to return to their homes.
3.

South Ossetia: Its Petition for Independence and Its
Occupation

Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia had attempted to declare its
independence from Georgia in 1990.172 That attempt, like its
1920 attempt, was rebuffed. 173 A 1992 referendum was not
recognized by the international community, and a 2006
referendum was similarly rejected by the United Nations, the
174
European Union, OSCE, NATO, and the Federation of Russia.
These entities recognized that the lack of ethnic Georgian
participation and the lack of recognition of the referendum by
the central Georgian government, made the referendum suspect
175
at best and likely illegal.
171. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1462, supra note 12, 1 15 (calling on Abkhaz authorities to
provide law enforcement and provide Georgians with native-language education); S.C.
Res. 1615,
21, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1615 (July 29, 2005) (calling on the Abkhazians to
open the Gali branch of the human rights office); S.C. Res. 1781,
7, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1781 (Oct. 15, 2007) (calling on both sides to resolve the issue of refugees and
internally displaced persons); see also Kira Kay, Citizens of Abkhazia Strive to Shape Sovereign
Nation, ONLINE NEwSHOUR, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/
july-dec08/abkhazia_08-21.html (interviewing several Abkhazians who did not recognize
Abkhazia as part of Georgia and reporting on the use of Russian currency in business
transactions).
172. See U.S. Supports Peaceful Resolution in South Ossetian Convlict, AMERICA.GOV,
Apr.
1,
2008,
http://www.america.gov/st/texttran-english/2008/April/
20080401160643 xjsnommis0.2964398.html [hereinafter "AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian
Conflict"] (noting that the contemporary conflict dates back to 1920 when South Ossetia
attempted to declare independence from Georgia, then a Soviet Republic).
173. See id. (stating that Georgia responded firmly and negatively toward South
Ossetia's September 1990 declaration of independence).
174. See Vladimir Socor, Moscow's FingerprintsAll Over South Ossetia's Referendum, 3
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, Nov. 15, 2006, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/
?nocache=l&tx-ttnews%5Btt-news%5D=32238 (reporting that Moscow conceded that
the referendum would not lead to immediate international recognition of South Ossetia
as an independent state, but would be an exercise that could not be ignored); see also
Photini Pazartzis, Secession and InternationalLaw: The European Dimension, in SECESSION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 355, 368 (describing the
reaffirmation by the international community, particularly the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE"), of territorial integrity with respect to the states
created after the Soviet break-up).
175. See South Ossetia Referendum and the Follow-Up, CTR. SEC. INT'L STUD., Nov. 17,
2006, available at http://www.csis.ro/articles/former-soviet-spacel.html
(reporting
that a separate, simultaneous referendum against independence was held by the ethnic
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The peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, on the other
hand, were legal, having been recognized by the Security
Council. 176 They were not, however, U.N. peacekeeping forces,
possibly leading to their ultimate failure.
UNOMIG was
established by Security Council Resolution 858 in August 1993
with a six month mandate to observe and work with disputing
parties-but only in Abkhazia, not in South Ossetia. 177 The
actual peacekeepers in Abkhazia were made up of forces from
the Commonwealth of Independent States. 178 John Boonstra, a
writer for Better World Campaign, observes that these forces
were the very parties involved in the conflict: "In practice [having
peacekeepers drawn from the Commonwealth of Independent
States] means that Georgians, Ossetians, and Russians, with very
little neutral oversight, will be supervising their own peace
accord.' ' 179 The "very little neutral oversight" refers to the
unarmed UNOMIG observers-136 in total and all originally
deployed to Abkhazia, with none allocated to South Ossetia. In
South Ossetia, the Joint Peacekeeping Forces group was made up
of Georgians, Russians, and Ossetians, with South Ossetians

Georgians); see also South Ossetia, Kosovo and Sustainability, INT'L RELATIONS & SEC.
NETWORK, Nov. 20, 2006, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/
Security-Watch/Detail/
?ots59 =4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=52730
(calling
Moscow's position "more ambiguous").
176. See S.C. Res. 858, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 (Aug. 24, 1993) (welcoming "the
proposed
deployment
of
mixed
interim
monitoring
groups
of
Georgian/Abkhaz/Russian units designed to consolidate the cease-fire, and request[ing]
the Secretary-General to facilitate cooperation between the United Nations observers
and these units within their respective mandates").
177. See id. (establishing UNOMIG of eighty-eight military observers and minimal
staff for a period of six months, with the possibility of extensions).
178. See id.
6; see also UNOMIG's Mandate, U.N. Observer Mission in Geor.,
available at http://www.unomig.org/glance/mandate/
(describing its mission and its
working relationship with the Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS")).
179. John Boonstra, A U.S.-UN History Lesson in Georgia, UN DISPATCH, available at
http://www.undispatch.com/archives/20O8/1 0/a_us-unhistory.php#more.
Tensions
between Georgians and Russians can be traced back at least to the 1921 Red Army
invasion and the Soviet government's 1922 declaration of South Ossetia as an
Autonomous Oblast within Georgia. See generally AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian Conflict,
supra note 172 (describing the genesis of the contemporary conflict between South
Ossetia and Georgia as South Ossetia's attempt to declare itself an independent Soviet
Republic).
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serving within the North Ossetian contingent. 80 All were under
Russian command.' 8 1 The OSCE monitored the situation and
182
facilitated negotiations, overseeing a period of relative calm.
4.

Georgian-South Ossetian Violence

The relative calm began to crack once Mikheil Saakashvili
replaced Eduard Shevardnadze as president. 183
Saakashvili,
interested in reigning in the breakaway regions and having made
a campaign promise to recover them, 184 began regulating South
Ossetian trade, prompting the South Ossetians to close highways,
and detain Georgian troops within the region. 8 5 Tensions eased
after an August 2004 cease-fire agreement, but rose again, not
only between Georgia and South Ossetia but within South
Ossetia itself as Saakashvili recognized a South Ossetian
government that would accept autonomy within Georgia rather
than independence. 186 Violence escalated and, in 2006, U.S.
180. AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian Conflict, supra note 172 (describing the elements
of the June 1992 Sochi Agreement and the make-up of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces
group).
181. Id.; see also U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH

OFF.,

COUNTRY PROFILE:

GEORGIA, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/europe/georgia/
?profile=politics&pg=7 (last visited July 14, 2009) (profiling Georgia, including the
situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
182. See AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian Conflict, supra note 172.
183. See id.(providing an overview of Georgian-South Ossetian relations after
Saakashvili's election and his subsequent closing of a South Ossetian market used for
unregulated trade and describing the reasons for and reaction to President Saakashvili's
action in this area).
184. See Karon, supra note 158 (contrasting President Saakashvili's agenda to
restore control in South Ossetia to Russia's agenda of "stoking the fires of secession in
Georgia").
185. See AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian Conflict, supra note 172, (explaining the
deterioration of relations in 2004 after the relative cessation of hostilities following the
Sochi Agreement). The international community may find Georgia's actions acceptable
since it is not uncommon for central governments or organizations to regulate trade.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes"); Ernest
A. Young, ProtectingMember State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales
from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1634-35 (2002) (noting that the
European Court of Justice has ruled that administrative regulations enacted by the
European Commission takes precedence over national legislation).
186. See AMERICA.GOV, South Ossetian Conflict, supra note 172, (describing two de
facto administrations in South Ossetia, one accepting autonomous status for South
Ossetia and one rejecting it). See generally, Ellen Barry, Georgia's Public, and Battered, Face
in a Separatist Republic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at A8 (profiling ethnic Ossetian Dmitri
Sanakoev, his inability to win the "hearts and minds" of South Ossetians, and citing his
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Ambassador Julie Finley went before the OSCE and expressed
concern over the shooting down by South Ossetian militia of a
Georgian helicopter carrying Georgia's Defense Minister.18 7 In
June 2008, Finley again addressed the OSCE, this time looking
for a condemnation of an alleged attack by a Russian fighter
plane that downed a Georgian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle over
Georgian airspace. 8 8 The allegation was supported by a report
by UNOMIG and other analyses. 189 If this last event was murky,
murkier still were the events in August 2008 that led up to the
Georgia-Russia conflict.
Saakashvili claims that he began firing missiles into South
Ossetia to "restore constitutional order," 190 despite warnings
from allies that he should refrain from taking military action. 19 1

autobiography that suggests that the opposing de facto government of Eduard Kokoity is
inciting ethnic tensions).
187. See Restraint Urged for Parties in Georgia-South Conflict, AMERICA.GOV, Sept. 14,
2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/September/20060914172542
xlrenneF0.7395855.html (reporting that the Ambassador condemned the attacks as
criminal, but praising the OSCE for itsquick investigation of the incident and other,
similar attacks).
188. See Finley Statement in Vienna Addressing Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
AMERICA.GOV, June 11, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/June/
20080611143806xjsnommis0.4999506.html
(providing the Ambassador's remarks in
which she also calls on the organization to think creatively to ease tensions).
189. Id. ("UNOMIG's report, as well as the independent analysis of all available
data by a team including U.S. experts and representatives of other countries, leads to
one clear conclusion: on April 20, a Russian fighter plane shot down a Georgian UAV
['unmanned aerial vehicle'] over Georgia's sovereign airspace.").
190. Karon, supra note 184 (quoting the Saakashvili administration).
191. See id. ("NATO officials had repeatedly warned the Georgian government
against launching any attempt to resolve the dispute through military means."). But see
Andrew E. Kramer, For a President With a Penchantfor Flourishes, a Rebuke in the Boom of
Artillery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A12 ("The Bush administration, with its broad
assurances of support for Georgia, has come in for strong criticism in Georgia for having
emboldened Mr. Saakashvili to challenge Russia."). It is also suggested that Saakashvili
sees the South Ossetian conflict as "a struggle ... between Russia and expanding
Western influence in the states of the former Soviet Union." Id. The United States has
found managing the relationship with Saakashvili difficult. See Marc Champion et al.,
U.S.Ally Proves Volatile Amid Dispute with Russia-GeorgianPresident Says West Ignored Pleas
for Support, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2008, at A6 (describing the personal as well as political
ties that Saakashvili has with the United States); see also C.J. Chivers & Ellen Barry,
Accounts Undercut Claims by Georgia on Russia War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at Al
(finding that the accounts of independent military observers could not settle questions
of the extent of Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages); Karon, supra note 158
(suggesting that some may view Saakashvili's actions as a way to force NATO into action
on his behalf). But see Marc Champion, British Monitor Complicates GeorgianBlame Game,
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The Russians convened the Security Council, looking for a
resolution condemning Georgia's actions, but failed to pass a
resolution that appeased all members. 192 Afterward, Russian
forces fought back in both South Ossetia and Georgia proper,
with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev justifying the attacks as
193
an obligation to defend the life and honor of Russian citizens.
The manner of Russian activity in South Ossetia was and is
not limited to military force. Moscow's mayor, Yuri M. Luzhkov,
has made frequent visits to South Ossetia, pledging "more than
194
[US]$100 million [for] houses, schools and shopping centers."'
Luzhkov's activities in South Ossetia and elsewhere "unnerves
Russia's pro-Western neighbors because he flouts diplomatic
rules that prohibit aid to separatists." 95 The mayor's activities,
and even Russia's conflict with Georgia would not be of concern
for this Note, were it not for Russia's justification for recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. Russia claims
that Georgia has stripped the regions of their autonomy, 196 and
that claim should not be peremptorily dismissed, since a
repression of autonomy could justify secession. Georgia's allies,
as noted above, have likewise questioned Saakashvili's actions
and judgments. 197 On the other hand, the veracity of Russia's
claim should be tested. The actions of the Federation of
Russia-and of the city of Moscow-may give insight into the
objectivity of the country's position. Part III of this Note sorts
through the claims and facts and applies the law to determine
whether independence should be recognized.

WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at A9 (reporting on one monitor who went absent without
leave across Russian lines, leading to questions of objectivity).
192. Karon, supra note 184 ("The United State and others objected to language
that appeared to exempt Russia from condemnation over the use of force.").
193. See id. (adding that Russia would not let those responsible for deaths in
Georgia's attacks on the South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali go unpunished).
194. Clifford J. Levy, Mayor of Moscow Exports Russia's New Nationalism, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2008, at Al.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (contrasting Georgia's
administration of South Ossetia with Russia's administration of Chechnya).
197. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (warning Saakashvili to refrain from
taking military action).
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III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE DISTINCT
CASES OF KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSSETIA
The international community should focus on resolving the
conflicts in Kosovo and South Ossetia between the peoples' right
to self-determination and the states' right to territorial integrity.
Every action of the international community should be to
reconcile the conflict in each case rather than to use each case as
a proxy for today's superpowers. Alasania's reference to "foreign
sponsored groups"'9 8 alludes to a return to the Cold War
situation when the Security Council was essentially paralyzed
from taking action in regional conflicts due to the superpowers
forming alliances and using the regions as proxies. 199 To free the
regions from this burden, it is necessary to establish their rights
to statehood without regard to the political agendas of
superpowers and their allies. Yet, this alone will not achieve the
goal of the United Nations to suppress acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace. The end of this Part will review what the
international community must do to promote peace within the
territories regardless of their status as autonomous regions or
independent states.
To avoid the mistake of conflating the two cases, this Part
will review Kosovo and South Ossetia in turn. The conclusion in
both cases is that the international community should continue
to recognize each as an autonomous region within the larger
state, rather than recognizing them as independent states.
Applying the same principles and coming to similar results does
not mean, however, that the conclusion of one case dictates the
outcome of the other. They are distinct cases and they come to
the same results by analyzing their own facts. In the case of
Kosovo, certain facts qualify this conclusion. That case will be
discussed first.
A.

Kosovo's Casefor Independence

The language of the League of Nations Commission was
firm in its denial of the Aaland Island's petition for breaking

198. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (contrasting Russia's treatment of
Chechnya with Georgia's treatment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
199. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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from Finland so that it could join with Sweden.2 00 The "wishes
and good pleasure" of minorities, the Commission declared,
should not be allowed to destroy order and stability.2 0' It may be
argued that order and stability have long been absent in the
Balkans and that Kosovo independence may actually bring about
their return. While such a result is possible, it is no more than
conjecture. The example of separating Pakistan from India
shows that independence will not necessarily bring peace to a
region. 202 In that case, India at least assented to the breakup,
whereas in the current case, Serbia is adamantly opposed to
breaking up its internationally-recognized territory. Acceptance
by both the minority region and the larger state from which it
wants to break does not guarantee a perfect and peaceful
solution, but it should be a prerequisite for secession.
The need for mutual acceptance can be overridden by
egregious abuses of minority rights, however.
The state
responsible for those minority abuses must be warned that its
behavior is unacceptable and that failing to remedy the problem
will result in the international community recognizing a
unilateral referendum on secession by the minority region. Both
the referendum and recognition of the result should be driven by
the U.N. Security Council rather than by individual states or
regions within states. All states should then back the final
decision of the Security Council. This process is, of course,
subject to the veto of its permanent members. The veto will
likely result in few changes to the status quo of borders.
Maintaining the status quo is not necessarily a bad result because
the member states will then be forced to support efforts to
protect the rights of minorities. This is not a revisit of the failed
negotiations of the 1990s 203 as long as states accept and support
the process. Following the process should also alleviate the
concern that recognizing Kosovo's independence would provide

200. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (stating that bending to the desires
of minorities was a threat to stability).
201. Id. (conceding that secession could be considered when the State cannot or
will not protect the minority's rights).
202. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (observing that internal issues of
minority rights have evolved into international tensions between two nuclear powers).
203. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (describing the resolutions for
and unsuccessful attempts at a peaceful solution that called for the respect of minority
rights of Kosovar Albanians and the territorial integrity of Serbia).
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an excuse for future secessionist movements, since the process
does not reward unilateral or violent actions.
Lacking a legitimate referendum for the break-up of Serbia
and Kosovo, the international community should look at whether
Serbia failed in its responsibility to protect its minority
population. The answer to this query is that not only did Serbia
fail to protect the population, but it instigated, particularly
through the leadership of Slobodan Milogevie, much of the
suffering endured by the Albanians.2 0 4 Ramet describes the
conditions for Kosovar Albanians in the period from 1988 to
1997, which include the termination of Albanian-language
education; the reduction of the province's autonomy; the firing
of Albanians from jobs; the confiscation of land; and the arrest
and beating of Albanians. 2 5 Kokott adds that the Academy of
Sciences and Arts of Kosovo was discontinued and its property
was confiscated; there was enactment of discriminatory laws; and
religious and cultural monuments were destroyed. 20 6 Neither the
U.N. Charter, nor the 1970 Declaration, nor the ICCPR, suggests
that past Albanian offenses20 7 may be used as a defense for this
derogation of their rights. Kosovar Albanians' right to selfdetermination does not derive from Serbian abuses, and it does
not disappear because of Albanians' own abuses toward Serbs.
The right instead derives from the Charter, declarations, and
208 It
resolutions that clearly and repeatedly express the right.
exists without the need for some external trigger, such as
oppressive government actions. The government, though, also
has rights. 20 9 Yugoslavia, rather than Serbia, was a party to the
ICCPR, 210 but that does not deprive Serbia, now recognized as a
state, 2 1' of its rights, including territorial integrity. A state's rights
204. See supra notes 47, 124 and accompanying text (providing examples of alleged
abuses).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra notes 123 and accompanying text (recounting alleged abuses of
Serbs by Albanians).
208. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (citing the U.N. Charter and
Security Council Resolution 1160, expressing the right of self-determination of peoples,
particularly, in the case of the Security Council Resolution, the Kosovar Albanians).
209. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (citing the command of the U.N.
Charter that member states recognize other states' territorial integrity).
210. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the fights of Albanians
under the ICCPR and Serbia's relation to the treaty).
211. See id. (regarding the Serb-Montenegro split).
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are inviolable except when, according to Dr. Seidel, a state
deprives a people residing within its territory of the right to selfdetermination, at which point the state may be susceptible to
21 2
secession of the territory.
Seidel argues that Serbia did, indeed, forfeit its right to
territorial integrity through its brutal oppression of the Kosovar
Albanians. 2 13 Belgrade failed to grant and maintain autonomy
for Kosovo. 214
Seidel believes that "Belgrade could have
from
the
Kosovo
secessionist
movement
prevented
materializing."' 215 There is support for this belief. The Albanians
had followed the "Ghandian counsel" of Ibrahim Rugova and
resisted the use of violence. 216 Belgrade kept up the oppression,
however, until the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") began
perpetrating terrorist actions in 1997 that signaled the shift
2 17
toward a more violent Albanian response.
The Albanians' own use of violence to gain independence
does not necessarily remove any right to secession that may exist,
even though the KLA terrorist actions were illegal and should be
condemned.2 1 8 The violence that may deprive Kosovo of a right
to secede is its violent actions toward its own minority Serbs when
the Albanians had power. Seidel recognizes the concern that if
Kosovo is given independence, Kosovo's Albanian majority will
oppress the eight percent minority population, as the Albanians
once did when they had more autonomy. 219 Seidel's answer to

this is that the international community should "demand that the
Kosovo Albanians respect the minority rights they themselves
fought for." 220

He also counters that the mere possibility of

212. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (citing Seidel's reasoning for when
secession may be an internationally acceptable option).
213. See id. (describing the conditions in Kosovo that make Serbia susceptible to
Kosovo secession).
214. See id. (arguing that Belgrade's policies toward Kosovojustified secession).
215. Id.
216. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the events that led to
the shift from non-violent to violent resistance against the Milogevi regime).
217. See id. (suggesting that such actions as attacks on the Serbian police
undermined the more moderate Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova).
218. See id. (noting that the Security Council did, indeed, condemn "the KLA and
other armed Kosovo Albanian groups").
219. See id. (noting, but casting doubts on, reports of Albanian rape and abuse of
Kosovar Serbians in the 1980s).
220. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (reviewing the duties of the state
toward its minority populations).
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future minority abuse should not deprive Kosovo of independent
statehood. 221
That would be true if violence toward and
oppression of minorities were only theoretical. Instead, the
Kosovar Albanians have indeed oppressed the Serbian minority
within its territory and have recently done so. 222 It is therefore
difficult to argue that Serbian oppression should deprive Serbia
of a right to territorial integrity, but Kosovar oppression should
have no similar sanction.
Seidel further argues that "the people of Kosovo [have] the
same right as the other peoples of the former Yugoslavia to
secede from the Yugoslav State." 223 That argument ignores the
claim that Serbia has to the territory. The Serbian claim may be
countered by the fact that Albanians have lived in the territory
now for centuries and that the world community should
recognize the reality of the region. 224 Such claims and counterclaims are destined to allow neither side to make progress. While
not a precedent, the Aaland Islands are a model for what can
happen over time if both sides move past their disappointments
and respect one another; the claims do not disappear, but they
become less important as the business of life moves the citizens
forward to a peaceful and content resolution that might have
225
once seemed anathema to them.
Seidel presents a compelling, but unconvincing argument
for Kosovo's independence. 226 He analogizes the Serb-Albanian
hostilities to those of spouses with irreconcilable differences. 227
The analogy has only limited applicability. Hostile spouses are
221. See id. (noting that an independent Kosovo would include an eight percent
Serbian minority that has historically been abused by Kosovar Albanians).
222. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the violence each side
has committed on the other).
223. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (arguing that the Kosovo people
should be allowed to exercise that right given that the fall of Milogevie has not changed
the Serbian government's treatment of the Kosovar Albanians).
224. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying (following the demographic shifts in
Kosovo).
225. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (suggesting a long-term positive
outcome can result after the international community denies to recognize the will of
people of an autonomous region and reporting that the Aaland Islands acted as a model
for the Croatian peace plan).
226. See supra notes 94, 212 and accompanying text (reviewing Seidels's arguments
for Kosovo independence).
227. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (suggesting that the hostilities
justify a split).
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generally free to move apart; there is no such opportunity for
Kosovo and Serbia. Achieving the international goal of peace
and security requires mutual respect. This will be a challenge
whether the two partners are within a single internationally
recognized border or two; the better solution is to resolve the
internal minority issues rather than breaking the country into
ever-smaller, independent pieces that will still contain minorities
and ethnic tensions.
After several failed attempts, the latest plan for EULEX
appears to be focused on the challenge of governing rather than
The Serbian and Kosovar
the politics of recognition. 228
interpretations of the plan may be at odds, 229 but for now, it is
probably best that the international community allow each side
its own interpretation and let peace take hold. Nations should
refrain from posturing and insisting on one interpretation, that
is, independence or autonomy. 230 Practical issues that arise from
the different interpretations should be addressed on an ad hoc
basis.
The international community should also review its motives
for recognizing Kosovo's independence. Sympathy toward the
Albanians is understandable after the violence they have
endured. There may be another motive, though, for recognition
of Kosovo. Some have suggested that the West may view its
support of the Muslim Albanians as a way to improve its image in
the Islamic world. 23 1 This may seem like good foreign policy, but
it is contrary to maintaining the integrity of Serbia's territory, and
there is evidence that actions supporting Kosovo do not
necessarily prevent anti-West activity by militant Islamists. The
NATO attacks on Yugoslavia in the 1990s that helped Muslims in
both Bosnia and Kosovo apparently did little to prevent Islamist
attacks on NATO member states in the following decade. 232 It is
228. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing the functional, nonpolitical aspects of the European Union Rule of Law Mission ("EULEX") mission in
Kosovo).
229. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing the Kosovo mission of
EULEX from the Serbian and Kosovar viewpoints).
230. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the 1999 Rambouillet
agreement that avoided explicitly addressing Kosovo independence).
231. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (implying that the West is
attempting to win Muslim favor at the expense of Russia).
232. See id. (relating the NATO support of the Albanians and the subsequent
terrorist attacks on Western targets).
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also bad policy to bend international law, hoping for a quid pro
quo. Bending law is unlikely to produce satisfactory results in the
long run, and doing so destroys the credibility a nation needs to
be an impartial arbiter of disputes.
Much of the hatred between the Serbs and Albanians was
inflamed during the reign of Slobodan Milogevi& 233 It will likely
take years, if not generations, for passions to cool and for energy
to be redirected toward productively building the region. On the
other hand, if the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians see that they have
an audience and partisan allies, they will have less incentive to
put down their passions or their guns, believing that their
patrons will help them win a better deal. The international
community should therefore step back from allying itself with
one side or the other. It should instead follow the philosophy
articulated in the U.N. Charter and subsequent resolutions. It
should follow a process that supports that philosophy, one that
advocates self-determination and autonomy for Kosovo, respect
for Serbia's territorial integrity, and recognition of the rights of
minorities. Forming alliances, pitting the West against Russia, is
unproductive, unnecessary, and irrelevant to the actual needs of
the Serbian and Kosovar peoples.
There is a caveat to the conclusion expressed above. The
international community should now concentrate on EULEX's
practical mission of establishing peace and security for the
citizens and refrain from making assertions regarding Kosovo's
independence. As part of its mission, EULEX should help Serbia
and Kosovo to develop an internal structure that will suppress
and eliminate the hatred that Milogevie and others inflamed.
That is discussed further in Section C.
B.

South Ossetia's Casefor Independence

States need objectivity and credibility to address South
Political interests have
Ossetia's claim for independence.
strained both. The West has struggled, not always successfully, to
separate personality from politics when dealing with Mikheil
Saakashvili. 234 Russia has taken positions not supported by facts,
233. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (reviewing the role of Milogevie in
exacerbating Serb-Albanian tensions).
234. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of reigning
in Saakashivili and the personal ties he has with the United States and U.S. politicians);
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but rather based on a tit-for-tat reasoning stemming from the
West's recognition of Kosovo. 215 Ambassador Churkin answered
U.S. criticism of Russia's incursion into Georgia, a sovereign
state, by invoking the U.S. incursion into Iraq. 236
The
comparison is inapt; a defense for robbing a bank is not that
one's neighbor has also robbed a bank.
Other evidence that raises doubt about Russia's objectivity
23 7
and accuracy is its assessment of Abkhazia's lack of autonomy,
which appears to run counter to the reports that the Security
Council relied upon when drawing up its resolutions regarding
Abkhazia. 238 Those resolutions reveal a territory that must have
had significant autonomy: The Security Council repeatedly
called upon Abkhazia to improve human rights within its
territory, to open a human rights office in Sukhumi, to provide
education in the native tongue of Georgians, and to allow
refugees to return to their homes. 239 These were all apparently in
the control of Abkhazia. Abkhazia also held elections and a
referendum, although the Security Council deemed these
unacceptable and illegitimate. 240
In August 2008, reporters
visited a relatively calm Abkhazia and found a territory that
considered itself independent of Georgia. 241 While the world did
not recognize Abkhazia as an independent state, many of its
citizens did. The Abkhaz population was in the majority, and

see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (quoting 2008 Presidential Candidate John
McCain at the beginning of the Georgia-Russia conflict in South Ossetia).
235. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (reviewing Russia's promise to
recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states if the West recognized
Kosovo as an independent state).
236. See id. (quoting Ambassador Churkin's rhetorical question regarding weapons
of mass destruction, which were the reason given for the U.S. invasion of Iraq).
237. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (indicating possible evidence of
Russia's motives for its position).
238. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing some of the Security Council
Resolutions calling on Abkhazia to take action regarding human rights within its
territory).
239. See id. (citing the Security Council Resolutions calling on Abkhazia to take
actions that are indicative of autonomy).
240. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidity of a
unilateral referendum).
241. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing journalist Kira Kay's report
interviewing Abkhazians who seemed to consider Abkhazia de facto independent).
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ethnic Georgians had no representation in the Abkhaz
242
government.
The Russian assertion regarding Georgia stripping South
Ossetia of autonomy would similarly surprise journalists who saw
Georgia as having made an uneasy peace with the province, from
which several thousand ethnic Georgians were displaced. 243 The
uneasy peace gave way to fighting between Georgia and Russia in
South Ossetia. 244 The purpose of this Note is not to determine
whether Russia was an illegal aggressor in the conflict; the
conflict provides, rather, additional evidence that must be
reviewed to determine whether the actions of Georgia with
regards to South Ossetia give rise to forfeiture of Georgia's right
to its territorial integrity and whether the international
community should recognize South Ossetia's independence.
First, it must be determined if the population, or a
significant part of the population, of South Ossetia is a "people"
with a right to self-determination. 245 The task is more difficult
here than in Kosovo. The Russian and Georgian Orthodox
Churches see enough similarities to regret that "Orthodox
Russians are bombing Orthodox Georgians," two groups sharing
"centuries of political and economic ties." 246 The languages
differ, but as the Switzerland example illustrates, linguistic
differences do not necessarily create distinct "peoples." 247 To
external eyes, then, it may be difficult to see the Ossetians as a
"people" distinct from Georgians for the purposes of selfdetermination. Difficulties aside, the question has already been
resolved by the parties themselves.
Georgia has previously
granted South Ossetian rights to self-determination. As a result,
since the two concerned parties have already agreed on this issue,
242. See id. (reporting that Abkhazia has a thirty-five member parliament, although
ethnic Georgians do not have representation).
243. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (reporting on the humanitarian
crisis in Georgia).
244. See id. (reporting Moscow's readiness, in the context of its disapproval of
Georgia's move toward NATO and the recognition of Kosovo, to help South Ossetian
secessionists in case of an attack from Georgia).
245. See supra Part I.B. (exploring the definition of a "people").
246. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (exploring the definition of a
"people").
247. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that John A. Perkins has
observed that language in Switzerland does not necessarily differentiate groups of a
population as separate peoples).

20091

INDEPENDECEOF KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSETTIA

2041

it is not necessary to dwell on whether or not the designation is
appropriate.
Having put aside the question of whether the South
Ossetians can be defined as a people, three issues remain. The
first is whether or not Georgia used force against South Ossetia.
If it did use force, the second issue to consider is whether that
force was legal. If the force was not legal, the final issue is
whether or not the use of force gives rise to South Ossetia's
unilateral declaration of independence from the rest of Georgia.
The definition of force in this case is relatively easy, because
the question concerning all, including the international
community, is whether Georgia used military force on South
Ossetia. The answer is undoubtedly "yes." There seems to be
little or no argument that on August 8, 2008, Georgia's President,
Mikhail Saakashvili "shelled South Ossetia and launched a
ground invasion deep into the territory." 248 Whether or not this
was justified under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter-that is,
legal-is a more difficult question.
Skirmishes had been
occurring between Georgia and Ossetian separatists, 249 but
military observers and monitors in the area cannot corroborate
reports of South Ossetian attacks that supposedly prompted the
Georgian shelling and ground invasion. 250 Without evidence of
attacks, one doubts that Georgia had to resort to military action
rather than going to the United Nations for assistance. Assuming
there were no attacks, Georgia could either have made a mistake
or intentionally shelled its own South Ossetian population. The
latter possibility would rise to the level of illegality. Unless the
Georgian attacks were sustained, however-and not intentionally
provoked by outside forces-it would be difficult to use them as
an excuse for secession. Rather, the international community
should condemn the attacks and give Georgia the opportunity to
cease hostilities and make reparations, where appropriate.
248. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (referring to the hostilities in South
Ossetia in August 2008 and the resulting humanitarian crisis).
249. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (conjecturing that Saakashvili's
invasion was intended to force NATO's hand in the situation, presumably on the side of
Saakashvili).
250. See id. (questioning facts of lead-up to August 2008 war). The facts may never
be known. For the current analysis, the assumptions made are those that are most
unfavorable to Georgia in order to determine if Georgia's actions would rise to the level
that would justify South Ossetian independence.
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In trying to justify independence for South Ossetia, a better
argument might be found in Georgia's closing down of an
unregulated trade market in South Ossetia, 251 which some might
view as an affront to South Ossetia's autonomy. The problem
with this argument, though, is that regulation does not
necessarily mean a lack of autonomy or self-determination. In
the United States, for example, the federal government regulates
interstate and foreign trade while states have autonomy in many
other areas.2 52 Similarly, in the European Union, member states
maintain their autonomy while subjecting themselves to EU
regulations, particularly regarding trade. 253 The test for the
international community should be whether Georgia treats all
regions equally in its setting of regulations. If it does not, it
should be given the opportunity to remedy the situation before
secession is considered.
Georgia's treatment of South Ossetia is in need of
improvement, but it does not provide South Ossetia with a case
for independence.
Lacking a valid referendum on South
Ossetia's independence that represents all of Georgia, the
international community should not recognize South Ossetia as
an independent state. The international community should
instead call on Georgia to address any human rights abuses that
have apparently taken place, and it should monitor the actions of
the Georgian government with regards to South Ossetia. The
international community should also be clear to the South
Ossetian leadership that it will recognize South Ossetia as an
autonomous region within Georgia, and that it, too, must be
respectful of the rights of the minorities within its region.
C.

Domestic Law Must Address Ethnic Tensions to Support the Goals
of InternationalLaw

The two preceding sections ended by acknowledging the
ethnic tensions in each of the territories. These tensions may
251. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting the differing approach
toward South Ossetia taken by Saakashvili versus that of former President
Shevardnadze).
252. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (citing the U.S. Constitution and
the right of the federal government to regulate commerce interstate and international
commerce).
253. See id. (referring to the European Court of Justice holding that regulations
enacted by the European Commission takes precedence over national legislation).

2009]

INDEPENDECEOF KOSOVO AND SOUTH OSETTIA

2043

have been inflamed by political leaders, 254 but they exist even
without bad leadership.2 5 5 As noted above, when rival states form
alliances and appeal to ethnic or nationalistic passions, they are
failing to live up to the principles of the United Nations and are
exacerbating rather than healing breaches of the peace. The
international community should abide by international law itself,
and it should help the regions to develop a domestic law
structure that resolves ethnic tensions.
Oscar Ruebhausen,
accepting the Yale Law School Association Medal in 1978, noted
that lawyers are among the architects of society. 256 Lawyers from
the international community should help lawyers within Serbia
and Georgia build the legal architecture that supports the better
impulses of man, and tear down that which shelters his worse
nature.
Ambassador Churkin implied that the United States is in no
position to be lead architect, given its history.2 57 On the contrary,
the United States is in a unique position to help because of its
history. Forty years ago, fire hosing of protesters against racial
inequality258 and fire bombing of churches out of racial
animosity259 did not give much hope for an integrated American
society. By 2008, however, an event that once would have led to
violence, the election of an African-American President, instead
led to celebration-even by the losing party. 260 American society
has changed, and law was there to support that change.

254. See supra notes 124, 186, 204 and accompanying text (discussing the role that
politicians play in exacerbating ethnic tensions).
255. See supra notes 123, 153 and accompanying text (reporting distrust and
violence of one ethnic group toward another).
256. Oscar Ruebhausen, Acceptance Speech at Yale Law School, 1978, reprinted in

25 YALE L. REPORT 12 (1978).
257. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (citing the Ambassador's comment
regarding U.S. intervention in Iraq).
258. See,
e.g.,
Civil
Rights:
Birmingham,
Alabama,
http://www.africanaonline.com/civil-rights.birmingham.htm (last visitedJuly 14, 200).
259. See, e.g., Rev. Albert D'Orlando, FIRST CHURCH NEW ORLEANS,
http://www.firstuuno.org/mainwebsitehtml/dorlando.html (last visitedJuly 14, 2009).
260. SeeJohn McCain, U.S. Senator and Candidate for U.S. President, Concession
Speech
After 2008
Presidential Campaign
(Nov. 5, 2008),
available at
http://wvw.politico.com/news/stories/1108/15303.html (noting that a black dining at
the White House was once met with outrage, recognizing the historic significance of the
election in which his opponent, an African-American, won and viewing it as a
demonstration of the distance the country had traveled from old injustices).
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There are poor architects, to be sure, and the work of poor
architects must sometimes be torn down to rebuild better
structures. It took architects like Harry Truman and Hubert
Humphrey, for instance, to tear down segregation in the
military. 261 That old, segregated military was recently on display
in New York. Coincidental to the election of the United States'
first African-American President was a revival of the musical play,
SOUTH PACIFIC, in which a segregated military fights for ideals it
does not quite manifest. Although the military's segregation is
not discussed in the play, an officer bitterly observes that hatred
of other ethnicities are inflamed by a clan mentality that believes
"[y] ou've got to be taught before it's too late . . .to hate all the
262
people your relatives hate."
Oscar Hammerstein's words reflect the same urgency of a
twisted philosophy that is expressed by the warring parties in
For nation-building and the
Kosovo and South Ossetia. 263
creation of peaceful states, governments must help all of their
peoples to unlearn inherited animosities that are aggressively
taught as part of ethnic culture. It can be done. In Europe,
while some states struggle to assimilate new ethnic groups into
their societies, 264 others talk of political leadership coming from
new generations of non-European immigrants. The German
Green Party is now led by a second generation Turk. 265 Germany
2 66
It
also has the ninth largest Jewish population in the world.
and
if
Turks
but
may not yet be true that "we are all Georgians,"
Jews can say, "We are German," it should be possible for South
261. See generally TrumanLibrary.org, Desegregation of the Armed Forces,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/desegregation/large/
index.php?action=chronology (last visitedJuly 14, 2009).
262. Oscar Hammerstein II, You've Got to Be Carefully Taught in SOUTH PACIFIC 14546 (Albert Sirmay ed., Williamson Music 1949).
263. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing the fears of Westerners of a
Europe subdued by Islamists); see also, Corso, supra note 153 (quoting one participant:
"They need to be met with strength. They don't need negotiations. They [participant's
side] need to either shoot them or beat them."). Others, perhaps less carefully taught,
were more optimistic that if the Russian troops left, the two factions would be at peace.
Id.
264. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (giving as examples France and the
Netherlands).
265. SeeJudy Dempsey, Germany's Green Party Elects First Ethnic Turk as Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, atA9.
266. See World Jewish Population, http://www.simpletoremember.com/vitals/
world-jewish-population.htm (last visitedJuly 14, 2009).
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Ossetians to someday say, "We are Georgian," and for Kosovar
Albanians to say, "We are Serbian." This may not be possible or
comfortable for them right now, but there are examples for them
to follow and international law to support their better impulses.
CONCLUSION SAME OBJECTIVES, SEPARATE CASES, SIMILAR
OUTCOMES
The international community should not recognize either
Kosovo or South Ossetia as independent states at this time. This
conclusion does not conflate the two cases; the two cases, each
decided on its own merits, happen to have similar outcomes.
Ambiguities in international law may blur the distinctions of the
cases, and some have suggested that the international community
should clarify the right to self-determination in non-colonial
contexts to make conclusions less prone to politics. 267 A better
solution would be to base decisions on principles, allowing
flexibility as new circumstances arise. This does not guarantee
the "right" decision, but it would at least help parties work
through the right process and help the international community
from rushing toward risky political alliances. The task ahead for
Kosovo and South Ossetia will be difficult, because of ethnic
tensions, often inflamed by political leaders. However, ethnic
groups that are now warring managed to live together in the
past, 268 implying that they can do so in the future. Nations
should unite in helping Serbia and Georgia remain united
themselves, free from breaches of peace and the scourge of war.
This help is possible by stepping back from fractious alliances
and stepping up to the task of developing a structure of law that
supports the rights of all citizens within the unified countries.

267. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (citing Jonathan I. Charney, who
argues that clarification may help prevent both secessionist groups and the mother state
from taking provocative actions).
268. See Dan Bilefsky, 13 Years After Peace Accord, Fear Grows of New Ethnic Conflict in
Divided Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A6 (explaining that the three ethnicities
were once closely entwined, including intermarriage).

